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MUSLIMS AND THE MYTHS IN THE IMMIGRATION POLITICS
OF THE UNITED STATES

SOHAIL WAHEDI *
Today, the explicit use of anti-immigration rhetoric has become
common among a significant portion of the American political
establishment. The 2016 election of President Trump generated a
tougher attitude toward immigration and immigrants. Subsequently,
the 2018 midterm elections revealed an increase in “Islamophobic”
rhetoric among political campaigners. This article focuses on the
challenges faced by one group—the Muslim community. Specifically,
this article aims to shed light on the ways in which the contemporary
anti-immigration atmosphere has targeted American Muslims. In doing
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article is made possible by the Erasmus School of Law Innovation Programme
Research, Erasmus Trustfonds and the International Center for Law and Religion
Studies at Brigham Young University. The main argument of this article on singling
out the Islamic faith for special bans was discussed in San Diego (“Border Myths”
Symposium 2019, March 9, 2019); Bologna (“European Academy of Religion”
Annual Conference 2019, March 4, 2019); Prague (“State Responses to Security
Threats and Religious Diversity” Conference, Nov. 26–28, 2018) and Rio de Janeiro
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so, this article analyzes recent public decisions that have both burdened
the Muslim community and negatively affected immigrant civil liberties.
Drawing on these recent decisions, the article proposes a strategy to
overcome this contemporary era of fear, anxiety, and intolerance
toward newcomers—specifically those with an Islamic background.
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INTRODUCTION
The American Dream of “a land in which life should be better and
richer and fuller for every man, with opportunity for each according to
his ability or achievement,” 1 is a fruitful source of inspiration for many
1. JAMES TRUSLOW ADAMS, THE EPIC OF AMERICA 404 (1931). See also
Geoffrey D. Korff, Reviving the Forgotten American Dream, 113 PENN ST. L. REV.
417, 427 (2008) (quoting Adams and arguing that the classic work-hard-play-hard
conception of the American Dream with the aim of achieving a higher level of welfare
has made room for a thicker conception. Korff notes the modern version of the
American Dream includes other themes relevant to human flourishing, including
education, employment opportunities, healthcare, a reliable retirement system, and “a
general sense of social mobility.”).
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American societal groups in the fight for equality. 2 The American
Dream of a better life for everyone, everywhere in the United States, is
endorsed by the Declaration of Independence, which states clearly that
“all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the
pursuit of Happiness.” 3 This powerful and timeless promise of equality
and welfare inspired great advocates of civil rights and civil liberties,
such as Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. In what he revealed as “a dream
deeply rooted in the American dream,” Dr. King scrutinized the
presence of obvious inequalities in American society and urged the
nation to stop racial discrimination. 4 He dreamed of a land where
2. Although a shift has taken place in the way people have defined the American
Dream throughout history, today, the bottom line is an egalitarian approach: equal
opportunities for all citizens, regardless of their racial or economic background. See,
e.g., Andrea J. Boyack, A New American Dream for Detroit, 93 U. DET. MERCY L.
REV. 573, 574 (2016) (noting the American Dream “has always been one of equal
opportunity,” but arguing “there can be no equality of opportunity where there is such
a stark inequality” in Detroit’s neighborhood decline); Katherine M. Vail, Saving the
American Dream: The Legalization of the Tiny House Movement, 54 U. LOUISVILLE
L. REV. 357, 379 (2016) (arguing that the American Dream rests on an idea of creating
equal opportunities for all); Paul D. Carrington, Financing the American Dream:
Equality and School Taxes, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1227 (1973) (claiming “the
right to equal educational opportunity is the American Dream incarnate as
constitutional law.”). For an official endorsement of this egalitarian conception of the
American Dream, see George Bush, Exporting the American Dream, 17 HUM. RTS.
18, 19 (1990) (defending the export of the “American Dream” to new democracies
and arguing that equality is the most important principle in law that should be
guaranteed and protected strongly. That is a democracy “that supports a strict equality
of rights: one that guarantees all men and women—whatever their race or ancestry—
stand equal before the law.”).
3. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); see also JIM
CULLEN, THE AMERICAN DREAM 38 (2003) (arguing that the second paragraph of the
Declaration of Independence is the “key” to this important document as it
“underwrites” the American Dream); Darrell A. H. Miller, Continuity and the
Declaration of Independence, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 601, 605 (2016) (critically analyzing
the language used in the Declaration and explaining why so many judges, politicians,
and civil rights activists have drawn on this document to develop their arguments).
4. Martin Luther King, Jr., “I have a Dream . . .” Speech at the “March on
Washington”
(Aug.
28,
1963)
(transcript
available
at
https://www.archives.gov/files/press/exhibits/dream-speech.pdf) (referring to the
Declaration of Independence’s promise of equality and criticizing the lack of
opportunities for non-white people to flourish in life due to the obvious presence of
racial discrimination).
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people would “not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content
of their character.” 5 He dreamed of true fulfillment of the promise “that
all men are created equal.” 6 With his renowned “I Have a Dream”
speech, Dr. King created awareness of parallel societies in the United
States where people did not live together, but rather were separated
from one another. He warned against the devastating effects of
segregation, discrimination, and hatred. 7 Dr. King described a
nightmare in which many people lived at that time, and declared his
unambiguous ambition to end this nightmare for those who faced hatred
and discrimination instead of opportunities and freedoms. 8
The resounding message behind Dr. King’s speech was that the
American Dream was a far destination for many American citizens to
reach. 9 His concerns about the inaccessibility of the American Dream
have urged politicians and legal scholars to consider concrete steps to
preserve this ideal. 10
Recent history reminds us that institutional support of inequality
reinforces the emergence of parallel societies. Within these divisions,
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.; see also Katharine Klebes, The Limited Provision of Mental Health
Services at Community Colleges: Obstacles, Initiatives, and Opportunities for
Change, 19 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 315, 322 (2017) (referring to a recent study
demonstrating how racism hinders the true social integration of students with
immigrant backgrounds on university campuses).
8. Cf. Kevin Brown, Hopwood: Was this the African-American Nightmare or
the African-American Dream?, 2 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 97, 102 (1996) (providing
an overview of cases that have challenged the legality of segregation and defending a
skeptical approach about eliminating racial discrimination in the future); Kevin
Brown, End of the Racial Age: Reflections on the Changing Racial and Ethnic
Ancestry of Blacks on Affirmative Action, 22 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 139, 139 (2017)
(noting “[m]any minority students experience the environment of their law school as
hostile.”).
9. Cf. Monroe H. Little, Jr., More than a Dreamer: Remembering Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr., 41 IND. L. REV. 523, 529 (2008) (highlighting the achievements of
Martin Luther King, Jr. to argue that Dr. King was more than the main voice of civil
rights protests).
10. David B. Oppenheimer, Dr. King’s Dream of Affirmative Action, 21 HARV.
LATINX L. REV. 55, 86 (2018) (arguing Dr. King’s work is still valuable to fight
inequalities related to race and class). See generally Trina Jones, Occupying America:
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the American Dream, and the Challenge of SocioEconomic Inequality, 57 VILL. L. REV. 339, 342 (2012).
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only a few people can benefit from opportunities to flourish, while
others suffer from stagnation and deprivation of basic liberties.11
Therefore, the idea that all people should have equal opportunities to
realize the American Dream is often echoed in initiatives propagated by
legal scholars, or enacted by law after extensive political debates. 12
However, despite the many initiatives geared toward creating equal
opportunities, the American Dream is still difficult to realize for many
groups in American society. 13 Even the historic victory of Barack
Obama in the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections, and the recent
elections of two Muslim women with immigrant backgrounds to
Congress, do not erase the palpable presence of racial discrimination in
the United States. 14
Studies have reaffirmed the presence of ethnic and racial
discrimination in aspects of life considered crucial for the realization of

11. E.g., Khaled A. Beydoun, Why Ferguson Is Our Issue: A Letter to Muslim
America, 31 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 1 (2015).
12. These steps are mainly in the fields of housing, health care, education,
employment, and political freedoms and are meant to provide all people—regardless
of their race, color, class, religion, origin, or sexual orientation—access to the basic
needs that enable them to flourish in American society. However, the changes in these
areas should not be overstated. See Damon J. Keith, What Happens to a Dream
Deferred: An Assessment of Civil Rights Law Twenty Years after the 1963 March on
Washington, 19 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 469, 469 (1984) (expressing that the
struggle for equality is not over, rather “the gains made in the legal arena over the
past . . . decades form only a skeletal foundation for the monumental changes that
must take place.”).
13. See generally Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV.
151 (2016) (criticizing the lack of equal protection in the case law of the Supreme
Court).
14. Alex M. Johnson, Jr., What the Tea Party Movement Means for
Contemporary Race Relations: A Historical and Contextual Analysis, 7 GEO. J. L. &
MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 201, 202 (2015) (pointing out that racism “remains
endemic in American society,” and noting the fact that some members of minority
groups have been successful is not indicative of equal opportunities for all); see also
Reginald Oh, Regulating White Desire, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 463 (2007).
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the American Dream. 15 Such discrimination exists in the job market,16
access to financial instruments, 17 housing, 18 education, and many other
areas. 19 In light of these findings, some scholars have suggested the era
of civil liberties is waning. 20 This sad and alarming conclusion is not a

15. Eric K. Yamamoto, Sandra Hye Yun Kim & Abigail M. Holden, American
Reparations Theory and Practice at the Crossroads, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2007)
(arguing the struggle for greater equality will continue because “the economic and
psychological wounds of slavery and segregation persist in the form of welldocumented discrimination . . .”).
16. E.g., Kevin Woodson, Derivative Racial Discrimination, 12 STAN. J. C.R.
& C.L. 335, 386 (2016) (introducing “derivative racial discrimination” as a form of
“institutional discrimination that disadvantages black workers derivatively” due to
socio-cultural differences).
17. E.g., Andrea Freeman, Racism in the Credit Card Industry, 95 N.C. L. REV.
1071 (2017) (reporting on the prevalence of racism and discrimination in the financial
world).
18. See generally Alexander Polikoff, Racial Inequality and the Black Ghetto,
1 NW J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 1 (2006); David R. James, The Racial Ghetto as a Racemaking Situation: The Effects of Residential Segregation on Racial Inequalities and
Racial Identity, 19 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 407 (1994); Karl Taeuber, The
Contemporary Context of Housing Discrimination, 6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 339
(1988).
19. E.g., Jason P. Nance, Student Surveillance, Racial Inequalities, and Implicit
Racial Bias, 66 EMORY L.J. 765, 784 (2017) (finding that schools with an
overrepresentation of racially-diverse students tend to be stricter on developing safety
measures despite a lack of empirical evidence in favor of this approach); Angela
Onwuachi-Willig,
Complimentary
Discrimination
and
Complementary
Discrimination in Faculty Hiring, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 763, 777 (2010) (identifying
a “unique” form of racial discrimination in the hiring system of universities).
20. This position has been defended explicitly in the aftermath of the 2013
Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013) (outlawing
the “coverage-formula” of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which was designed to
guarantee equal voting rights); see also Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer,
The Voting Rights Act in Winter: The Death of a Superstatute, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1389,
1391 (2015) (arguing the unambiguous message behind Shelby is that the era of civil
rights is over); Seth Davis, Equal Sovereignty as a Right Against a Remedy, 76 La. L.
Rev. 83, 118 (2015) (calling the decision in Shelby “not nuanced”); Ilya Shapiro,
Shelby County and the Vindication of Martin Luther King’s Dream, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 182, 191–92 (2013) (criticizing the critics of Shelby and arguing the
judgment reaffirms that “widespread, official racial discrimination in voting has
disappeared.”). See generally REBEKAH HERRICK, MINORITIES AND REPRESENTATION
IN AMERICAN POLITICS (2017).
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new revelation. 21 Rather, it is a renewed reminder of the complexity
involved in shaping the right conditions to provide all people equal
opportunities to flourish in life. 22
This lasting reminder illustrates the fragility and vulnerability of
the victories achieved in the field of civil liberties. 23 However, it does
not herald the end of the civil rights era. 24 Rather, this illustration
prompts us to be cautious. 25 The key questions are: how can we pursue

21. See, e.g., Mario L. Barnes, The More Things Change: New Moves for
Legitimizing Racial Discrimination in a Post-Race World, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2043,
2096 (2016) (providing an in-depth analysis of decisions reached by the Supreme
Court in employment, education, and voting rights cases that touch upon the theme of
racial discrimination and claiming that the Court’s rejectionist approach toward the
“realness of race” has obviously resulted in the current situation, in which “the Court
avoids interrogating larger concerns such as structural racism and white supremacy.”);
see also Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291, 338–92
(2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (suggesting race still matters “because of persistent
racial inequality in society”).
22. Deborah Hellman, Two Concepts of Discrimination, 102 VA. L. REV. 895,
906 (2016) (pointing to a serious challenge caused by affirmative actions: “these
policies express that blacks are inferior to whites. Why is that problematic? It is
problematic because one way to fail to treat people as equals is to express that they
are not, in fact, equals.”); see also Anita Christina Butera, Assimilation, Pluralism and
Multiculturalism: The Policy of Racial/Ethnic Identity in America, 7 BUFF. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 1, 3–8 (2001) (highlighting the main constraints of various models of
citizenship in addressing racism and discrimination).
23. See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, The Necessity of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
and the Difficulty of Overcoming Almost a Century of Voting Discrimination, 76 LA.
L. REV. 181, 185 (2015) (arguing that although the Voting Rights Act of 1965 has
improved political participation among the black population, “there are still large
disparities between the actual population of African Americans in the South and the
actual representation in southern legislatures and in Congress. In part, this is a result
of residual white hostility to black political participation.”); Anthony J. Gaughan, Has
the South Changed? Shelby County and the Expansion of the Voter ID Battlefield, 19
TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 109, 112 (2013) (expecting that Shelby will “retreat” historical
achievements).
24. See Kevin R. Johnson, The End of Civil Rights as We Know It: Immigration
and Civil Rights in the New Millennium, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1481, 1492–1510 (2002)
(arguing immigration will introduce all kinds of new civil rights disputes).
25. Michael Selmi, Understanding Discrimination in a Post-Racial World, 32
CARDOZO L. REV. 833, 855 (2011) (providing a clear analysis of the steps necessary
to reach an era in which racial discrimination is practically vanished from all
important aspects of life).
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the courageous path set out in Brown v. Board of Education, 26 and how
can we avoid a revitalization of Plessy v. Ferguson in the future? 27 Put
differently, how can we halt the “insidious and pervasive evil” that is
racial discrimination? 28 These are fundamental questions in an era
where, unfortunately, race is a decisive factor in the continuation of
obvious disparities between groups of people. 29 We must keep our eyes
open and remain alert to developments that jeopardize the equality
many have fought for over recent decades. 30
Admittedly, we have few reasons to be pessimistic about the
scholarly efforts that have highlighted “the stark reality that race
matters” in relation to opportunities that help people improve their
lives. 31 Yet, we do have reason to be worried, in general, about the rise
of intolerance toward newcomers and citizens with immigrant
backgrounds or ethnic appearances. In particular, there is cause for
26. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits racial discrimination at public schools); see also Derrick A.
Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93
HARV. L. REV. 518, 524 (1980) (suggesting the outcome in Brown was probably the
home version of the freedom and equality message spread by the United States during
the second world war).
27. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551–52 (1896) (upholding the notion that
separate but equal public education for different racial groups was not at odds with
the Fourteenth Amendment and effectively allowing the continuation of racial
segregation in public schools).
28. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966) (ruling on the
constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and terming racial discrimination
in the exercise of voting rights an “evil”).
29. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 298 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(noting “the effects of centuries of law-sanctioned inequality remain painfully
evident” in American society and referring to the presence of racial discrimination in
the job market, education system, and health sector).
30. Richard R. W. Brooks, The Banality of Racial Inequality, 124 YALE L. J.
2626, 2662 (2015) (referring to Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion in Schuette to
note that race is still relevant because many people suffer from racial discrimination
in their daily lives. To stop this unfortunate situation—Brooks again quotes Justice
Sotomayor—we must apply the Constitution in a way that shows awareness of the
long history of racial discrimination).
31. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291, 38 (2014)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124
HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (2011) (providing an in-depth analysis of the shift in the equal
protection jurisprudence, saying that the “end of traditional equality jurisprudence . . .
should not be conflated with the end of protection for subordinated groups.”).
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concern regarding the emergence and political advancement of
Islamophobia. 32 Nearly sixty years after Dr. King delivered his famous
speech, we must again be concerned with the inaccessibility of the
American Dream and the tragic re-emergence of a “system of racial
caste.” 33 Our main concern should be halting the reinforcement of
segregation that will inevitably increase fundamental disparities
between groups of people. The best solution to this problem lies within
the law and politics relating to immigration. 34
A brief analysis of modern immigration law reveals that many
stereotypes have been used to justify restrictions with far-reaching
consequences upon civil rights. The travel bans instituted by President
Trump, popularly known as the “Muslim ban,” 35 are timely examples
of regulations that rest strongly on anti-Muslim stereotypes and antiimmigration rhetoric. 36 Similarly, Oklahoma’s Save Our State
32. Cf. David S. Rubenstein, Taking Care of the Rule of Law, 86 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 168, 210 (2018) (critically discussing some of President Trump’s major antiimmigration projects).
33. Adarand Constructors v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 273 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); see also Frank S. Ravitch, Creating Chaos in the Name of Consistency:
Affirmative Action and the Odd Legacy of Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 101
DICK. L. REV. 281 (1997).
34. Cf. Geoffrey Heeren, Illegal Aid: Legal Assistance to Immigrants in the
United States, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 619, 662 (2011) (acknowledging that “any
challenge to the restrictions [of legal assistance to immigrants] must contend with the
conflicting jurisprudence of immigrant rights”); Saby Ghoshray, Is There a HumanRights Dimension to Immigration? Seeking Clarity Through the Prism of Morality
and Human Survival, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 1151, 1168 (2007) (analyzing the law,
politics, and jurisprudence of immigration).
35. Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017) [hereinafter
Exec. Order 13,769]; Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017)
[hereinafter Exec. Order 13,780] (both orders are titled Protecting the Nation from
Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States); Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg.
45161 (Sept. 24, 2017), [hereinafter Proclamation 9645] (titled Enhancing Vetting
Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by
Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats).
36. Khaled A. Beydoun, Muslim Bans and the (Re)Making of Political
Islamophobia, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1733, 1735 (2017) (arguing the Muslim ban fits
a long tradition of Islamophobia that has always been present in the American law
and politics of immigration); Ved P. Nanda, Migrants and Refugees Are Routinely
Denied the Protection of International Human Rights: What Does the Future Hold?,
45 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 303, 315 (2017) (arguing the travel ban embodies the
anti-immigration rhetoric of President Trump). Cf. Adrienne Rodriguez, A Cry for
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Amendment prohibited courts from using Islamic Sharia law or
international law, and therefore targeted immigrants with Islamic
backgrounds in particular. 37 This initiative rested on the same antiMuslim narratives and stereotypes as the recent travel bans.
What can we say about the contemporary tenor of politics
surrounding immigration, immigrants, and non-white citizens
generally? How shall we appraise, for example, an incident that took
place not so long ago in Washington D.C.? A group of teenagers,
equipped with “Make America Great Again” apparel, were caught in an
altercation with Nathan Phillips, a Native American activist and Omaha
tribe elder. Although Phillips was by no means an immigrant, the
teenagers allegedly chanted “build the wall!” 38—a reference to
President Trump’s plan to build a wall physically separating the United
States from Mexico. 39

Change: The Fallacy of the American Dream for K-4 Children, 16 SEATTLE J. SOC.
JUST. 399, 422 (2017) (suggesting the tougher attitude toward immigration may be
due to the election of President Trump).
37. Yaser Ali, Shariah and Citizenship—How Islamophobia is Creating a
Second-Class Citizenry in America, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1027, 1065 (2012) (exploring
the roots of Oklahoma’s Save Our State Amendment and arguing that this legal
initiative fits the tendency of Islamophobia, which reinforces racism toward Arab
Americans). For a discussion on the uselessness of anti-Sharia legislation, see
generally Lee Ann Bambach, Save us from Save Our State: Anti-Sharia Legislative
Efforts Across the United States and Their Impact, 13 J. ISLAMIC L. & CULTURE 72
(2011) (warning against the negative effects of anti-Sharia legislation upon businesses
and arguing that State and Federal law provide sufficient remedies to deter human
rights violations under Sharia law).
38. This is a contentious example due to the lack of video-recorded evidence
showing the teenagers shouting “build the wall!” See David Williams & Emanuella
Grinberg, Teen in Confrontation with Native American Elder Says He Was Trying to
Defuse
the
Situation,
CNN
(Jan.
23,
2019),
https://edition.cnn.com/2019/01/19/us/teens-mock-native-elder-trnd/index.html.
39. While referring to the Washington D.C. incident may be contentious, it is
valuable for the argument this article will develop about the rise of using hostile
rhetoric in politics to talk about immigration and people with immigrant backgrounds.
In this respect, “Make America Great Again” is a clear sign of support for President
Trump, who was elected after running a campaign full of anti-Islam and antiimmigration rhetoric. See Lindsay Pérez Huber, Make America Great Again: Donald
Trump, Racist Nativism and the Virulent Adherence to White Supremacy Amid U.S.
Demographic Change, 10 CHARLESTON L. REV. 215, 224 (2016).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol56/iss1/6

10

Wahedi: Muslims and the Myths in the Immigration Politics of the United S
Wahedi camera ready FINAL (Do Not Delete)

2019]

MUSLIMS AND THE MYTHS

1/30/2020 10:25 AM

145

How can we rationalize accusations of disloyalty against politicians
with immigrant backgrounds? 40 Take, for example, Rashida Tlaib, who
is among the first ever Muslims in Congress and one of only two
Muslim women ever elected to the House of Representatives. She has
been considered, by some, to be a potential danger because of her
Islamic and Palestinian background. One Florida city commissioner
went so far as to accuse Representative Tlaib “of being a ‘danger’ who
might ‘blow up’ the U.S. Capitol.” 41 Similar accusations have been
raised against Republican Shahid Shafi, elected Southlake City Council
member and vice chairman of the Tarrant County Republican Party in
Texas. His Muslim background has been used to portray him as an
unreliable person. In a special rally, the Tarrant Republicans asked the
party, in vain, to remove Sahid Shafi from his political post. As a
practicing Muslim, the Tarrant Republicans reasoned Shafi would not
be able to represent the Party, since “not [all] Republicans . . . think
Islam is safe or acceptable in the U.S., in Tarrant County, and in the
[Republican Party].” 42
Does the language used today to talk about immigration and those
with immigrant backgrounds or non-white appearances indicate that we
have entered an entirely new era? No. Immigration has always been a
40. Most notably against former President Barack Obama, accused of secretly
being a Muslim ruling the United States. See, e.g., Jared A. Goldstein, The Tea Party
Movement and the Perils of Popular Originalism, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 827, 848 (2011)
(discussing how President Obama was accused of being born outside the United States
and harboring a hidden faith: Islam).
41. See Holly Rosenkrantz, Florida Official Says U.S. Rep. Rashida Tlaib May
(Jan.
24,
2019),
“Blow
Up”
Capitol,
CBS
NEWS
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/florida-official-says-rep-rashida-tlaib-may-blowup-the-capitol/ (quoting Anabelle Lima-Taub, a Florida city commissioner, who
referred to Rashida Tlaib as a “Hamas-loving anti-Semite”). Similar accusations have
been raised against Muslim representative Ilhan Omar. See Katie Mettler, ‘Just Deal,’
Muslim Lawmaker Ilhan Omar Says to Pastor Who Complained About Hijabs on
POST
(Dec.
7,
2018),
House
Floor,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/religion/2018/12/07/just-deal-muslim-lawmakerilhan-omar-says-pastor-who-complained-about-hijabs-housefloor/?utm_term=.cf94512b35c8 (quoting critics of allowing representatives to wear
headscarves in the House of Representatives).
42. Adeel Hassan, Texas Republicans Rally Behind Muslim Official as Some
Try to Oust Him Over Religion, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/10/us/muslim-republican-shahid-shafi-texas.html
(quoting Dorrie O’Brien).
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subject of political debate in the United States. 43 Are the measures that
target some religious groups for special bans and restrictions unique in
their sort? Not really. In the past, some immigrants were expelled from
the colonies by powerful settlers because of their “heretic” views. More
generally, some colonies were “not open” to Baptists, Jews, and
Quakers. And, until very recently, Catholics in the United States
suffered from widespread feelings of animosity and prejudice dating
back from the Irish migration wave during the nineteenth century. 44
Can we say that actual or propagated bans that single out the
Islamic faith for special prohibitions and restrictions—such as those
targeting Muslims qua Muslims—add an entirely new perspective to
the debate about the law and politics of immigration in the United
States? Even this is not the case. For decades, immigrants from
predominantly Muslim nations, including non-Muslim immigrants such
as Christians, were deprived the right to become full citizens of the
United States. 45 In the years following the 2001 terrorist attacks, racial
profiling, discrimination, and hatred have been major issues for those

43. Cf. Pooja R. Dadhania, Deporting Undesirable Women, 9 UC IRVINE L.
REV. 53 (2018). See also Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Civil Rights in the
Trump Administration: Law and Policy Making by Executive Order, 57 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 611, 613–14 (2017) (arguing that history contains many examples of
anti-immigration policies); Amanda Frost, Independence and Immigration, 89 S. CAL.
L. REV. 485 (2016) (analyzing immigration law from a historical perspective); David
B. Oppenheimer, Swati Prakash & Rachel Burns, Playing the Trump Card: The
Enduring Legacy of Racism in Immigration Law, 26 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 1, 6
(2016) (providing a historical overview of immigration policies); Jill E. Family, The
Future Relief of Immigration Law, 9 DREXEL L. REV. 393, 395 (2017) (discussing the
future of deportation law and noting that immigration has always been part of the
political debate).
44. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE NEW RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE: OVERCOMING
THE POLITICS OF FEAR IN AN ANXIOUS AGE 7 (2012).
45. Id.; see also Beydoun, supra note 36, at 1735. Cf. Khaled A. Beydoun,
Between Muslim and White: The Legal Construction of Arab American Identity, 69
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 29 (2013) (exploring the roots and meaning of
“whiteness,” which was for a long period a requirement for a successful citizenship
application, and pointing to the lack of scholarly attention on cases challenging this
racial discrimination); Jonathan Weinberg, Proving Identity, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 731,
742 (2017) (arguing the Naturalization Act of 1790 made it practically impossible for
a group of Chinese immigrants to become citizens of the United States); Cheryl I.
Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1744–45 (1993) (arguing
that “whiteness” is important because of the associated privileges that come with it).
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with immigrant backgrounds in the United States. 46 This group
includes not only Muslims, but others whose appearances are similar to
adherents of the Islamic faith, 47 including those with headscarves or
turbans, beards, non-Hispanic brown complexions, and Middle-Eastern
postures. 48
Our brief analysis of the law and politics surrounding immigration
reveals that neither the strong language used in connection with
immigrants, nor the policies related to immigration, indicate that we
have entered a new anti-immigration era. In both cases, stereotypes
appear to be persistently present, governing the tone of the debate as
well as the seriousness of the interventions designed to regulate
immigration. 49 These persistent stereotypes have generated serious
46. Margaret Chon & Donna E. Arzt, Walking While Muslim, 68 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 243 (2005) (“a 2002 report released by the FBI reveals 481
hate crimes against Arabs and Muslims in the year 2001, representing an increase of
1600 percent over the previous year”); see also Makau Mutua, Terrorism and Human
Rights: Power, Culture, and Subordination, 8 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 1 (2002)
(exploring the roots of the “War on Terrorism” and the notion of the “‘us-and-them’
dichotomy”); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Is Immigration Law National Security Law,
66 EMORY L.J. 669 (2017) (discussing how the national security agenda has shaped
contemporary immigration policies); Sara Mahdavi, Held Hostage: Identity
Citizenship of Iranian Americans, 11 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 211 (2006) (“In the
aftermath of September 11, the federal government has revived the practice of
profiling people who appear to be Muslim, Arab, or Middle Eastern . . .”); Susan M.
Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After
September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 295, 295–96 (2002) (critical of the post-9/11 security measures that were
“‘pushing the envelope’ in restricting civil liberties in the name of national security”).
47. Romtin Parvaresh, Prayer for Relief: Anti-Muslim Discrimination as Racial
Discrimination, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1287, 1313 (2014); Sahar F. Aziz, Sticks and
Stones, the Words That Hurt: Entrenched Stereotypes Eight Years After 9/11, 13 N.Y.
CITY L. REV. 33, 42–43 (2009). See generally Vijay Sekhon, The Civil Rights of
“Others”: Antiterrorism, the Patriot Act, and Arab and South Asian American Rights
in Post-9/11 American Society, 8 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 117 (2003) (discussing how
non-Muslims have suffered from racial profiling and hatred following the 9/11
terrorist attacks).
48. Khaled A. Beydoun, Acting Muslim, 53 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 4 (2018)
(exploring the consequences of purposefully manifesting or hiding the Islamic faith
in public).
49. Today, the explicit use of anti-immigration rhetoric has become common
within the American political establishment. It has provoked the immigration debate
and has shaped the contours of contemporary political discourse. The 2018 midterm
elections showed a clear increase in Islamophobic rhetoric within political campaigns.
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concern regarding undocumented immigrants, illegal border crossings,
and national security threats. The latter concern is often used to justify
the special need for radical measures in the fight against immigration—
measures that range from building a separation wall between the United
States and Mexico, 50 to issuing travel bans that deny citizens of some
countries access to the United States. 51
People with immigrant backgrounds often suffer harassment,
hatred, and racial profiling as a consequence of this harsh political
reality. 52 Remaining silent in the face of this discrimination only
advances the process of creating parallel societies with second-class
citizens. 53 This interim conclusion exhorts us to be cautious. While the
inaccessibility of the American Dream remains a larger issue, the reemergence of Islamophobia is especially concerning. This article thus
focuses on the challenges faced by the Muslim community today.
More generally, the 2016 election of President Trump resulted in a tougher attitude
toward immigration and immigrants. This attitude has manifested itself in two ways.
First, the language used to discuss immigration is generally aggressive in tone.
Second, there is a proliferation of actual or propagated restrictions that aim to reduce
immigration numbers. What is striking about both political developments is the
abundant use of stereotypes. See generally Nanda, supra note 36.
50. See Nick Miroff & Josh Dawsey, Trump Wants His Border Barrier to be
Painted Black with Spikes. He Has Other Ideas, Too, WASH. POST (May 16, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/trump-wants-his-border-barrier-to-bepainted-black-with-spikes-he-has-other-ideas-too/2019/05/16/b088c07e-7676-11e9b3f5-5673edf2d127_story.html. See generally Moria Paz, Between the Kingdom and
the Desert Sun: Human Rights, Immigration, and Border Walls, 34 BERKELEY J. INT’L
L. 1 (2016) (providing a thought-provoking explanation for the rise of physical walls
separating states).
51. Jennifer M. Chacón, Immigration and the Bully Pulpit, 130 HARV. L. REV.
F. 243, 257 (2017) (describing how the Trump administration framed the travel ban
for different purposes. To supporters of a stricter immigration policy, it was presented
as the promised Muslim ban. In courts, however, it was defended as a necessary
security measure). Cf. Bill Ong Hing, Entering the Trump Ice Age: Contextualizing
the New Immigration Enforcement Regime, 5 TEX. A&M L. REV. 253, 256–77 (2018)
(arguing that many of the immigration policies today continue the line that was set
out by preceding administrations).
52. Cf. Lawrence J. Trautman, Presidential Impeachment: A Contemporary
Analysis, 44 U. DAYTON L. REV. 529, 564 (2019) (listing examples of racism and
discrimination involving the Trump administration).
53. Ali, supra note 37, at 1031, 1067 (arguing that “growing anxiety and
antagonism toward Islam and Muslims—Islamophobia—as exhibited by the
Oklahoma law is creating a distinct second-class citizenry.”).
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Specifically, this article explores how the contemporary antiimmigration climate—particularly the increased focus on border
protection—has impacted the Muslim community.
Part I of this article focuses on recent public decisions burdening
Muslims, such as the travel bans implemented by President Trump, and
analyzes the legality of those policies. Part II looks critically at how
particular steps taken in the public and private fields have contributed
to the racialization of Muslims.54 This Part explores the stereotypes and
conspiracy theories developed to gain political support for far reaching
anti-immigration policies. Not only do these policies aim to limit
opportunities for legal immigration to the United States, they
specifically target people with immigrant backgrounds, such as the
Muslim community. 55 In Part III, the article draws upon this theoretical
framework to introduce a strategy to overcome this era of fear, anxiety,
and intolerance toward newcomers and those with immigrant
backgrounds. This article concludes that the racialization of people
with immigrant backgrounds contributes to the creation of parallel
societies. This development, in turn, negatively affects equal access to
fundamental liberties. Consequently, not everyone has an equal ability
to flourish in life and to achieve the promises of the Declaration of
Independence that made the American Dream possible. A final
reflection about the tendency of singling out certain groups for special
prohibitions follows in the epilogue of this article.
I. PROTECT OUR NATION FROM MUSLIMS
In what has been considered Donald Trump’s “most infamous antiMuslim screed,” he called for “a total and complete shutdown of
Muslims entering the United States.” 56 This dramatic call came just
days after the 2015 terrorist attack in San Bernardino. At the time,
54. Nagwa Ibrahim, The Origins of Muslim Racialization in U.S. Law, 7 UCLA
J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 121, 142 (2008) (positing that “racialization of Muslims” has
resulted in “a new zone of lawlessness where [Muslims] are neither citizen nor alien,
but rather [adherents of the] inherently evil world called ‘Islam.’”).
55. Cf. MUSLIM ADVOCATES, RUNNING ON HATE (2019) (surveying the
prevalence of anti-Muslim rhetoric in the context of the 2018 midterm elections).
56. Gregory Krieg, Trump’s History of Anti-Muslim Rhetoric Hits Dangerous
New Low, CNN (Nov. 30, 2017), https://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/29/politics/donaldtrump-muslim-attacks/index.html (quoting President Trump advocating for a Muslim
ban until the authorities “figure out what the hell is going on.”).
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Donald Trump was a frontrunner in the Republican Party’s primaries
for the 2016 presidential elections. In a sense, his call for singling out
Muslims for a special entry ban did not come as a surprise. 57 This was
not Donald Trump’s first anti-Muslim plan. Prior to these statements,
Donald Trump had shown a strong aversion to granting asylum to
refugees coming from Syria, comparing them to the “Trojan horse.” 58
He also suggested closing mosques, colorfully describing them as
places where “some of the hatred—the absolute hatred—is coming
from.” 59 Thus, the calls to introduce an entry ban singling out Muslims
fit a longer tradition of proposals targeting both Muslims and their
religion for special restrictions and prohibitions. 60 However, this call
to stop Muslims coming to the United States was something more than
putting out an anti-immigration feeler—it set the tone for a new, antiMuslim rhetoric. 61
The call to stop Muslims from entering the United States soon
proved to be more than political rhetoric. In 2016, newly-elected
President Trump delivered on his campaign rhetoric. Upon taking
office, he issued two Executive Orders and one Proclamation,
predominantly targeting travelers from Muslim-majority countries. 62

57. Cf. Vienna Flores, Competing Paradigms of Immigrant Human Rights in
America, 21 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 459, 466 (2015).
58. Jenna Johnson & Abigail Hauslohner, ‘I Think Islam Hates Us’: A Timeline
of Trump’s Comments About Islam and Muslims, WASH. POST (May 20, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/05/20/i-think-islamhates-us-a-timeline-of-trumps-comments-about-islam-andmuslims/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.418b059fabaa (providing an overview of antiMuslim statements made by President Trump).
59. Id.
60. Cf. Pérez Huber, supra note 39, at 225 (on Trump’s attitude toward the
Latino community).
61. See, e.g., Johnson & Hauslohner, supra note 58 (quoting Trump saying: “I
think Islam hates us.”). See generally Khaled A. Beydoun, 9/11 and 11/9: The Law,
Lives and Lies that Bind, 20 CUNY L. REV. 455 (2017) (discussing President Trump’s
anti-Muslim agenda).
62. Matthew J. Lindsay, The Perpetual Invasion: Past as Prologue in
Constitutional Immigration Law, 23 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 369, 389 (2018)
(pointing out President Trump’s anti-Muslim rhetoric during the presidential
campaign was something more than a slip of the tongue).
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The “Muslim Ban” became a reality, 63 throwing the United States back
to a dark era of racial discrimination. 64 This Part analyzes the history
of the travel bans and the various case law addressing the lawfulness of
these restrictions.
A. Executive Order 13,769
Despite harsh criticism from lawyers, political leaders, and
commentators, the newly elected President introduced Executive Order
13,769, popularly known as the “Muslim Ban,” just days after the
presidential election. 65 By signing this order, titled Protecting the
Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, the
President paved the way for the realization of one of his major election
pledges: enacting a travel ban for Muslims. 66 After all, Donald Trump’s
election campaign was highly dedicated to border protection and
national security issues, focusing specifically on who enters the country
and how to stop those “invaders.” 67

63. Id. For an extensive overview of travel restrictions targeting Muslims, see
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, National Security, Immigration and the Muslim Bans, 75
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1475 (2018).
64. Julia G. Young, Making America 1920 again? Nativism and US
Immigration, Past and Present, 5 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 217 (2017)
(comparing the anti-immigration era of 1920 to the present day and concluding there
are many similarities between the two eras of nativism).
65. Lindsay, supra note 62; see also Jennifer Lee Barrow, Trump’s Travel Ban:
Lawful but Ill-Advised, 41 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 691 (2018) (arguing that border
and admission questions fall under the authority of the president, making Executive
Order 13,769 lawful); Michael B. Mukasey, Judicial Independence: The Fortress
Threatened from Within, 47 U. MEM. L. REV. 1223, 1232 (2017) (defending the ban
as a matter of national security).
66. Exec. Order 13,769, supra note 35, at 8977; see also Harold A. Lloyd,
Speaker Meaning and the Interpretation and Construction of Executive Orders, 8
WAKE FOREST J. L. & POL’Y 319, 332 (2018) (analyzing Trump’s anti-Muslim
rhetoric and its contribution to the enacted travel restrictions).
67. Cf. Stuart Chinn, Threats to Democratic Stability: Comparing the Elections
of 2016 and 1860, 77 MD. L. REV. 291, 293 (2017) (noting that immigrants, Muslims,
and Muslim-Americans were “central parts” of President Trump’s presidential
campaign); A. Reid Monroe-Sheridan, Frankly Unthinkable: The Constitutional
Failings of President Trump’s Proposed Muslim Registry, 70 ME. L. REV. 1 (2017)
(discussing the constitutionality of President Trump’s proposed “Muslim registry”).
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Executive Order 13,769 aimed to protect the United States against
foreign terrorism, drawing on experiences from the 9/11 attacks. The
main purposes of this order were to fill an important security gap and
eliminate opportunities for foreign nationals to commit acts of terrorism
within the United States. 68 The Order urged authorities to approach
foreign nationals’ travel requests with stricter scrutiny. 69 The main
argument behind this tougher attitude toward immigration and border
protection was that:
[the] United States cannot, and should not, admit those who do not
support the Constitution, or those who would place violent ideologies
over American law. In addition, the United States should not admit
those who engage in acts of bigotry or hatred (including ‘‘honor’’
killings, other forms of violence against women, or the persecution
of those who practice religions different from their own) or those
who would oppress Americans of any race, gender, or sexual
orientation. 70

Upon first read, Executive Order 13,769 singled out troublemakers
for special travel restrictions. But more specifically, this order
suspended—categorically—the issuance of travel visas and other
“immigration benefits” to nationals of “countries of particular
concern.” 71 Although not all explicitly mentioned in the text, these
countries of particular concern included Syria, Iraq, Iran, Libya,
Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. This was evident from the decision to
revoke all issued and valid visas—except diplomatic visas—to
nationals from these seven countries. 72
The issued travel restrictions targeted people from Muslimmajority countries in particular. Put differently, Executive Order
13,769 predominantly singled out Muslims for a special prohibition:
68. Exec. Order 13,769, supra note 35, at 8977 (in Section 1, the Order explains
that “while the visa-issuance process was reviewed and amended after the September
11 attacks to better detect would-be terrorists from receiving visas, these measures did
not stop attacks by foreign nationals who were admitted to the United States.”).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 8979 (only mentioning Syria by name for purposes of halting the entry
of refugees).
72. Tootkaboni v. Trump, No. 17-CV-10154, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14241, at
*5 (D. Mass. Jan. 29, 2017).
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travel to the United States. 73 The restrictions consisted of a general ban
on traveling to the United States for a period of 90 days. Additionally,
the order urged the Secretary of State to halt the admission of
refugees—regardless of their origin—for a period of 120 days, and to
suspend the entry of Syrian refugees indefinitely, claiming the presence
of pressing security needs. 74
However, Executive Order 13,769 did allow the Secretaries of State
and Homeland Security “to admit individuals to the United States as
refugees on a case-by-case basis, in their discretion, but only so long as
they determine that the admission of such individuals as refugees is in
the national interest. . . .” 75 In this respect, the ban urged authorities to
expedite refugee applications from persecuted members of religious
minority groups who would not pose security or welfare risks upon their
arrival into the United States. 76 Despite the presence of this tiny exit
door, scholars still criticized the ban for its vagueness, arbitrariness, and
willingness to stigmatize, drawing on strong anti-Muslim stereotypes,
such as honor killings and other forms of gender-related violence. 77
73. Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2187,
2192 (2018); Josh Blackman, The Legal Resistance, 9 FAULKNER L. REV. 45, 56
(2017); Latoya Tyson, A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Executive Order No. 13,780 as a
Disguise for a Muslim Ban: The Implications of International Refugee Assistance
Project v. Trump, 40 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 140, 141, 147 (2017) (all arguing Executive
Order 13,769 was designed to stop Muslims from visiting the United States).
74. Exec. Order 13,769, supra note 35, at 8979 (arguing that the entry of Syrian
refugees could harm national interests).
75. Id.
76. Id. (stating people in transfer could also be exempted). For a critique of the
choice to favor religious minority groups, see Barrow, supra note 65, at 694, 715
(noting that “giving preference to individual refugees on the condition that the
‘religion of the individual is a minority religion in the individual’s country of
nationality’ is a poor policy choice, reflecting an oversimplification of and common
misconception of religious persecution.”).
77. Kate Aschenbrenner Rodriguez, Eroding Immigration Exceptionalism:
Administrative Law in the Supreme Court’s Immigration Jurisprudence, 86 U. CIN.
L. REV. 215, 217 (2018) (criticizing Executive Order 13,769 as “vague”); Kaila C.
Randolph, Executive Order 13,769 and America’s Longstanding Practice of
Institutionalized Racial Discrimination Towards Refugees and Asylum Seekers, 47
STETSON L. REV. 1, 35 (2017); Melissa Brooke Winkler, Executive Order “Protecting
the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States”: Violating First
Amendment Rights or Altering Constitutional Provisions Granting Foreign Policy
Powers to the President?, 34 T. M. COOLEY L. REV. 79, 83 (2017) (critics questioned
why countries that have supported terrorism, such as Saudi Arabia, were not on the
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Executive Order 13,769 caused a wave of public indignation and
worldwide condemnation after media reports leaked footage of dozens
of stuck and detained travelers. 78 The enacted travel restriction further
provoked heated debate among legal scholars and immigration
attorneys. This debate was specifically geared toward claims of First
Amendment violations, 79 given the specific political context in which
the travel restrictions were realized, 80 and the clear presence of
favoritism toward religious minority groups. 81
It did not take long before this travel restriction was challenged in
court. In fact, the litigation journey started just hours after the
announcement of the restrictions. On January 28, 2017, in Darweesh
v. Trump, District Judge Ann Donnelly ordered a temporary injunction
list of countries affected by Executive Order 13,769); Sahar F. Aziz, A Muslim
Registry: The Precursor to Internment?, 2017 B.Y.U. L. REV. 779, 825 (2017); Eunice
Lee, Non-Discrimination in Refugee and Asylum Law (Against Travel Ban 1.0 and
2.0), 31 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 459, 464 (2017) (both positing that the aim to keep honor
killers outside the United States is an obvious reference to Muslims).
78. Enid Trucios-Haynes & Marianna Michael, Mobilizing a Community: The
Effect of President Trump’s Executive Orders on the Country’s Interior, 22 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 577, 590–95 (2018) (noting the role both media and attorneys played
in challenging the lawfulness of Executive Order 13,769, specifically drawing
attention to the allegedly unlawful detention of travelers coming from the banned
countries). For a discussion on the importance of media in another context, see Mimi
A. Akel, The Good, the Bad, and the Evils of the #MeToo Movement’s Sexual
Harassment Allegations in Today’s Society: A Cautionary Tale Regarding the Cost of
These Claims to the Victims, the Accused, and Beyond, 49 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 103,
106 (2018).
79. Earl M. Maltz, The Constitution and the Trump Travel Ban, 22 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 391, 396–407 (2018) (critically discussing the First Amendment
argument). Cf. Gary Feinerman, Civility, Dignity, Respect, and Virtue, 71 STAN. L.
REV. ONLINE 140, 144 (2018) (briefly highlighting the Establishment Clause
argument).
80. For a discussion of the importance of the broader political context for
determining the lawfulness of the imposed travel restrictions, see John G. Roberts, Jr.
et al., In Tribute: Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20 (2018)
(referring to the travel ban controversy and rhetorically asking “what if (some) words
are part of the problem?”). Cf. Anton Sorkin, Make Law, Not War: Solving the
Faith/Equality Crisis, 12 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 663, 723 (2018) (briefly discussing the
concept of using “extrinsic” evidence to help prove the main objective behind certain
actions and suggesting this approach was used in the context of President Trump’s
travel bans).
81. Keith A. Petty, Duty and Disobedience: The Conflict of Conscience and
Compliance in the Trump Era, 45 PEPP. L. REV. 55, 79 (2018).
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halting the removal of passengers with valid travel documents who
were affected by the imposed travel restriction. 82
On the same day, in Aziz v. Trump, District Judge Leonie Brinkema
from Virginia granted a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”),
ordering authorities to provide lawyers access to affected travelers at
Dulles International Airport who were in possession of valid entry
documents, such as green cards. Judge Brinkema further enjoined
authorities from removing those passengers. 83
In another TRO granted one day after Darweesh and Aziz, District
Judge Allison Burroughs of Massachusetts also enjoined authorities
from removing affected passengers in possession of lawful travel
documents and who, “absent the Executive Order, would be legally
authorized to enter the United States.” 84 This TRO also ordered
authorities “to notify airlines that have flights arriving at Logan Airport
of this Order and the fact that individuals on these flights [cannot] be
detained or returned based solely on the basis of the Executive Order.” 85

82. Darweesh v. Trump, No. 17 Civ. 480 (AMD), 2017 WL 388504 (E.D.N.Y.
Jan. 28, 2017) (two Iraqi men, Mr. Darweesh and Mr. Alshawi, were on their way to
the United States with valid travel visas. However, both were banned from entering
the country and put in detention because of the travel restrictions) (case information,
available at https://www.aclu.org/cases/darweesh-v-trump (last visited Feb. 15,
2019)); see also Matthew R. Segal, Civil Rights and State Courts in the Trump Era,
12 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 49, 58 (2018) (“Federal litigation aimed at President
Trump’s immigration crackdown has been important and, at times, wildly
successful”); Spencer E. Amdur & David Hausman, Nationwide Injunctions and
Nationwide Harm, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 49, 49 (2017) (briefly referencing the
injunction issued in Darweesh); Carson Holloway, Judicial Review and Subjective
Intentions, 9 FAULKNER L. REV. 1, 1 (2017) (referencing Darweesh and noting that
“those pressing this claim [against the travel restrictions] found a sympathetic ear in
some corners of the federal judiciary”).
83. Aziz v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-116, 2017 WL 386549, at *1 (E.D. Va. Jan. 28,
2017).
84. Tootkaboni v. Trump, No. 17-CV-10154, 2017 WL 386550, at *1 (D. Mass.
Jan. 29, 2017) (motion for extension of TRO declined in Louhghalam v. Trump, 230
F. Supp. 3d 26 (D. Mass. 2017)).
85. Id.; see also Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065, 1099 (2018) (pointing to the geographical limitedness of the
TRO in Tootkaboni, and the confusion it has caused regarding the question of who is
allowed to enter the country).
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Although none of these temporary orders explicitly required
authorities to provide entry to affected travelers, 86 the Trump
administration sharply criticized these legal decisions 87 and reiterated
that it would continue enforcing the travel restrictions “humanely and
with professionalism . . . to protect the homeland.” 88 The criticism,
however, did not come only from the Trump administration. Legal
scholars also expressed criticism of the way the judges blocked
enforcement of the Executive order. 89 Specifically, the critics were
concerned about the issuance of nationwide injunctions enjoining
authorities from enforcing the travel restrictions. 90 Critics questioned
the constitutionality of issuing geographically unlimited restraining
orders, or nationwide injunctions. 91 This criticism arose specifically in
the aftermath of the court’s decision—first granting a nationwide TRO
and later denying the stay thereof, pending an emergency appeal—in
Washington v. Trump, where the state of Washington, later joined by

86. An exception to this: Mohammed v. Trump, No. CV 17-00786 AB, 2017
WL 438750, at *1–2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2017) (enjoining the authorities from
“blocking the entry” of anyone traveling on a valid visa, though affected by the travel
restrictions).
87. Rebecca Buckwalter-Poza, New Sheriff, Old Problems: Advancing Access
to Justice Under the Trump Administration, 127 YALE L.J. F. 254, 267 (2017).
88. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., DHS Statement on Compliance with Court
Orders and the President’s Executive Order (Jan. 29, 2017) (transcript available at
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/01/29/dhs-statement-compliance-Court-orders-andpresidents-executive-order).
89. Frost, supra note 85, at 1068 (referring to the criticism that federal courts
lack authority to impose nation-wide injunctions). For examples of such criticism, see
generally Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction,
131 HARV. L. REV. 417 (2017); Zayn Siddique, Nationwide Injunctions, 117 COLUM.
L. REV. 2095 (2017).
90. Frost, supra note 85, at 1072, 1090 (advocating in favor of nationwide
injunctions in three circumstances: (i) if it is the only way for complete relief; (ii) if it
avoids irreparable injury; and (iii) if geographically curtailed injunctions would end
in chaos).
91. Josh Blackman, The 9th Circuit’s Contrived Comedy of Errors in
Washington v. Trump, 95 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 18, 21–22 (2017); see also Matthew
Erickson, Who, What, and Where: A Case for a Multifactor Balancing Test as a
Solution to Abuse of Nationwide Injunctions, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 331, 352 (2018)
(advocating for a balancing test to assess the necessity of nationwide injunctions).
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Minnesota, challenged the lawfulness of the enacted travel
restrictions. 92
While both the district court and the court of appeals appeared to
sympathize with the states’ view that the travel restrictions had
negatively affected them, neither court thoroughly engaged with
allegations that the travel restrictions were designed to ban Muslims
from entering the United States. This was likely due to the highly
“sensitive interests” involved in the litigation and the relatively limited
task of the court. 93 Particularly relevant here is the courts’ discussion
of separation of powers and the judiciary’s role to review immigration
policies. District Judge James Robart admitted he lacked authority
to create policy or judge the wisdom of any particular policy
promoted by the other two branches. That is the work of the
legislative and executive branches and of the citizens of this country
who ultimately exercise democratic control over those branches. The
role of the Judiciary and this Court, is limited to ensuring that the
actions taken by the other two branches comport with our country’s
laws, and more importantly, our Constitution. 94

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit continued this discussion on
separation of powers. While assessing the emergency motion of the
Federal Government to stay the TRO, pending an emergency appeal,
the court reasoned that
[although] our jurisprudence has long counseled deference to the
political branches on matters of immigration and national security,
neither the Supreme Court nor our Court has ever held that Courts
lack the authority to review executive action in those arenas for
compliance with the Constitution. To the contrary, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly and explicitly rejected the notion that the
political branches have unreviewable authority over immigration or

92. Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040, at *1 (W.D.
Wash. Feb. 3, 2017) (granting a nationwide TRO), aff’d, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir.
2017) (denying a stay of the granted TRO).
93. Cf. id.
94. Id.
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are not subject to the Constitution when policymaking in that
context. 95

This precedential backdrop led the Ninth Circuit to the conclusion
that it had the authority to review the lawfulness of executive actions.96
In ruling on the emergency motion to stay the TRO, the court employed
a four-part test:
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is
likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be
irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will
substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and
(4) where the public interest lies. 97

The Ninth Circuit concluded—preliminarily—that the Government
failed to meet its burden regarding the first two elements. 98 The court
further noted that the last two elements of the test also did not weigh in

95. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1162 (9th Cir. 2017) (also refusing—
with reference to Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) aff’d sub nom
United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271—any geographical limit of the TRO, because
“such a fragmented immigration policy would run afoul of the constitutional and
statutory requirement for uniform immigration law and policy.”).
96. Id. at 1164 (positing that “although Courts owe considerable deference to
the President’s policy determinations with respect to immigration and national
security, it is beyond question that the federal judiciary retains the authority to
adjudicate constitutional challenges to executive action.”); see also Jerry L. Mashaw
& David Berke, Presidential Administration in a Regime of Separated Powers: An
Analysis of Recent American Experience, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 549, 572 (2018)
(arguing that compared to the district court’s discussion of the separation of powers
argument, the Ninth Circuit’s discussion of this argument was less political in nature,
rather it was based “(facially) on more technical statutory interpretation.”).
97. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d at 1164 (quoting Lair v. Bullock, 697 F.3d
1200, 1203 (9th Cir. 2012) and noting that the first two questions are in fact leading,
while the last two steps matter only after the first two questions have been answered).
98. Id. (concluding that authorities had failed to prove the enacted regime of
travel restrictions “provides what due process requires, such as notice and a hearing
prior to restricting an individual’s ability to travel. . . . Rather, . . . the Government
argues that most or all of the individuals affected have no rights under the Due Process
Clause” and that the authorities had failed to prove that the absence of a stay would
cause irreparable injury).
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favor of the Government. 99 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit denied the
stay. 100
In response to this decision, President Trump quickly took to
Twitter, writing: “SEE YOU IN COURT, THE SECURITY OF OUR
NATION IS AT STAKE!” 101 The President’s challenge to go to court
soon became a reality. Although the nationwide injunction had
survived the first round of litigation, opponents of the travel restrictions
continued to challenge the Executive order. The growing body of court
rulings against the newly-enacted travel restrictions gave rise to a new
category of arguments, challenging the legality of the restrictions based
on religious discrimination, and specifically anti-Muslim
discrimination. 102 But courts showed reservation about accepting such
claims. 103
However, in granting the preliminary injunction in Aziz v. Trump
and enjoining authorities from enforcing a key section of Executive
Order 13,769, the court noted the ambiguity of the Trump
administration’s reasoning for the travel restriction. 104 Inside the
99. Id. at 1168–69 (“the States [of Washington and Minnesota] have offered
ample evidence that if the Executive Order were reinstated even temporarily, it would
substantially injure [them]” and concluding that both parties can draw on public
interest arguments).
100. Id. at 1169; see also S. Cagle Juhan & Greg Rustico, Jurisdiction and
Judicial Self-Defense, 165 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 123, 135 (2017) (defending the
Ninth Circuit’s anonymously written decision: “anonymity frames the debate in
institutional terms.”).
101. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 9, 2017, 3:35 PM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/829836231802515457.
102. Admittedly, allegations suggesting the enacted travel restrictions incarnate
the promised Muslim ban were raised previously. See, e.g., Washington v. Trump,
847 F.3d 1151, 1167 (9th Cir. 2017) (saying the states have provided evidence related
to the anti-Muslim character of the enacted travel restrictions).
103. For a denial of the Establishment Clause arguments in relation to the
imposed travel restrictions, see Louhghalam v. Trump, 230 F. Supp. 3d 26, 35 (D.
Mass. 2017) (“[The argument] that [Executive Order 13,769] favors Muslims over
Christians, in violation of the Establishment Clause [is flawed] . . . Nothing [in the
text of the Executive Order] compels a finding that Christians are preferred to any
other group.”).
104. See Aziz v. Trump, 234 F. Supp. 3d 724, 739 (E.D. Va. 2017) (enjoining
the authorities from enforcing § 3(c) of Executive Order 13,769, and specifying the
targeted groups); see also Josh Blackman, The Domestic Establishment Clause, 23
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 345, 346 (2018) (critical of accepting the Establishment

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,

25

California Western Law Review, Vol. 56 [], No. 1, Art. 6
Wahedi camera ready FINAL (Do Not Delete)

160

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

1/30/2020 10:25 AM

[Vol. 56

courtroom, the administration defended the restriction on neutral
grounds, presenting it as a necessary security measure. But outside the
court, the restriction was defended as a necessary means to address the
“Muslim problem.” 105 In discussing this ambiguity, the district court
stated:
The Establishment Clause concerns . . . do not involve an assessment
of the merits of the president’s national security judgment. Instead,
the question is whether the [executive order] was animated by
national security concerns at all, as opposed to the impermissible
motive of, in the context of entry, disfavoring one religious group
and, in the area of refugees, favoring another religious group. 106

The court further noted a “conceptual link between [the promised]
Muslim ban and the [imposed travel restrictions].” 107 Referencing
Rudy Giuliani’s comments about the rationale behind the travel
restriction, 108 the court concluded that the imposed restriction was not
designed to meet a pressing security need. 109 More importantly, the
court enervated the argument that authorities would become powerless
if the imposed travel restriction was to be interpreted as a Muslim ban.
The court qualified this fear as “exaggerated” and found the “the dearth
of evidence indicating a national security purpose” persuasive. 110 The
serious engagement of the court with this argument against the travel

Clause arguments in immigration law cases, positing that such arguments have “no
place in the realm of foreign affairs and national security.”).
105. See Aziz, 234 F. Supp. 3d at 730 (discussing President Trump’s relationship
with the enacted travel restrictions, before and after assuming office). See generally
Chacón, supra note 51, at 257 (arguing the enacted travel restriction regime was
defended differently for various uses: “to supporters, it was the promised Muslim ban,
but to Courts, it was not.”).
106. Aziz, 234 F. Supp. 3d at 735–36.
107. Id. at 737 (noting the “discriminatory purpose” of the action is what matters
for purposes of Establishment Clause analysis).
108. Id. at 736 (Giuliani had linked the imposed restrictions to the promised
Muslim ban).
109. Id. (saying that the context in which the travel restrictions were designed
“bolsters the . . . argument that the [choice to enact those travel restrictions] was not
motivated by rational national security concerns.”).
110. Id. at 737.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol56/iss1/6

26

Wahedi: Muslims and the Myths in the Immigration Politics of the United S
Wahedi camera ready FINAL (Do Not Delete)

2019]

MUSLIMS AND THE MYTHS

1/30/2020 10:25 AM

161

restriction makes Aziz an exceptional case. 111 Perhaps even more
importantly, Aziz is the first ruling in which the court explicitly hinted
to the unconstitutional nature of the travel restriction, concluding
“enjoining unconstitutional action by the Executive Branch is always in
the public’s interest.” 112
While litigation continued in the aftermath of Aziz and Washington
v. Trump, 113 the Trump administration announced it would issue a new
round of travel restrictions more “tailored to [the] very bad decision” of
the Ninth Circuit. 114 On March 6, 2017, almost six weeks after the
announcement of the first Executive order, the administration revoked
Executive Order 13,769 and issued Executive Order 13,780, also titled
Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United

111. Admittedly, arguments addressing the legality of the enacted travel
restriction from the angle of non-Establishment were discussed previously in
Louhghalam v. Trump, 230 F. Supp. 3d 26, 35 (D. Mass. 2017) (rejecting the
argument that the imposed travel restrictions violate the guarantees under the
Establishment Clause, reasoning that the language used in Executive Order 13,769 is
neutral and does not favor one religious group over another).
112. Aziz, 234 F. Supp. 3d at 739. Cf. Beatrice Catherine Franklin,
Irreparability, I Presume: On Assuming Irreparable Harm for Constitutional
Violations in Preliminary Injunctions, 45 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 623, 665 (2014)
(jurisprudential support in favor of the Aziz court’s position).
113. Not all litigation concerned the constitutionality of the imposed travel
restrictions or sought to enjoin authorities from the enforcement of the newly enacted
restrictions. However, the cases related in some way to the broader legal debate
surrounding the restrictions. See, e.g., Decker v. Washington, No. 3:17-CV-00254,
2017 WL 891318, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2017) (asking the court to overturn the
Ninth Circuit’s denial of stay decision); McDonnell v. City & Cty. of Denver, 238 F.
Supp. 3d 1279 (D. Colo. 2017) (on the lawfulness of the authorities’ decision to
prevent an anti-travel ban demonstration); Taiebat v. Scialabba, No. 17-cv-0805-PJH,
2017 WL 839807 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2017) (aimed at changing man’s legal status as
non-immigrant working and living in the United States, as he was afraid of not being
allowed to re-enter the country as an Iranian citizen). For a ruling brought before the
court by the challengers of the travel restriction, see International Refugee Assistance
Project v. Trump, No. TDC-17-0361, 2017 WL 818255 (D. Md. Mar. 1, 2017)
(granting a motion to proceed under pseudonyms).
114. Laura Jarrett, Allie Malloy & Dan Merica, Trump Promises New
Immigration Order as DOJ Holds Off Appeals Court, CNN (Feb. 17, 2017),
https://edition.cnn.com/2017/02/16/politics/donald-trump-travel-ban-executiveorder/.
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States. The pending appeal in the Ninth Circuit was voluntarily
dismissed. 115
B. Executive Order 13,780
In many ways, the new version of Protecting the Nation from
Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States was similar to its
predecessor, Executive Order 13,769. 116 Executive Order 13,780
retained the fixed period entry ban for nationals of six predominantly
Muslim countries: Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen,
claiming their admission “would be detrimental to the interests of the
United States.” 117 Additionally, the fixed period suspension of
admitting refugees under the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program
remained unhurt. 118 The same is true for the reference to potential
foreign troublemakers, such as honor killers. 119
However, this new travel restriction also contained important
differences from the previous order. 120 Iraq was removed from the list
of countries affected by the travel restrictions, 121 and the choice to keep
the other countries on the list was explicitly justified. 122 Additionally,
the new order provided guidance for dealing with those nationals who
115. Nanda, supra note 36, at 318; see also Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d
1168, 1183 (9th Cir. 2017) (Bybee, J., dissenting from the majority’s opinion not to
rehear the case en banc and saying “[even] if we have questions about the basis for
the President’s ultimate findings—whether it was a “Muslim ban” or something
else—we do not get to peek behind the curtain. So long as there is one “facially
legitimate and bona fide” reason for the President’s actions, our inquiry is at an end”).
116. See Barrow, supra note 65, at 692–94 (describing the similarities and
differences between the two Executive Orders).
117. Exec. Order 13,780, supra note 35, at 13213.
118. Id. at 13215 (the case-by-case decision to admit some refugees in spite of
the enacted travel restrictions also remained intact).
119. Id. at 13217 (urging authorities to inform the President about “the number
and types of acts of gender-based violence against women, including so-called ‘honor
killings,’ in the United States by foreign nationals.”).
120. See Barrow, supra note 65, at 693.
121. Exec. Order 13,780, supra note 35, at 13212 (“[T]he close cooperative
relationship between the United States and the democratically elected Iraqi
government, the strong United States diplomatic presence in Iraq, the significant
presence of United States forces in Iraq, and Iraq’s commitment to combat ISIS justify
different treatment for Iraq.”).
122. Id. at 13210–11.
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had been affected by the travel restrictions but possessed valid travel
documents. 123
More importantly, Executive Order 13,780 was Trump’s response
to the litigation surrounding revoked Executive Order 13,769 in
general, 124 and in particular to the panel’s opinion denying the
government’s motion to stay the TRO. 125 Consequently, the new order
gave the President room to waive aside allegations of a discriminatory
rationale behind the former version. President Trump defended the
revoked version, saying:
Executive Order 13769 did not provide a basis for discriminating for
or against members of any particular religion. While that order
allowed for prioritization of refugee claims from members of
persecuted religious minority groups, that priority applied to
refugees from every nation, including those in which Islam is a
minority religion, and it applied to minority sects within a religion.
That order was not motivated by animus toward any religion, but was
instead intended to protect the ability of religious minorities.126

The President also showed serious disagreement with the Ninth
Circuit’s denial of the motion to stay. While the court agreed the
executive branch is in a better position to make decisions concerning
the admission policy, it—in spite of this important acknowledgement—
”declined to stay or narrow [the granted TRO] pending the outcome of
further judicial proceedings.” 127 However, the “better position”
argument led the President to design a new travel ban, 128 which
123. Id. at 13213–14 (for example, excepting green card holders; people with
valid travel visas; and affected nationals with dual citizenship, so long as the travel
documents are not issued by one of the affected countries).
124. Id. at 13210 (speaking of a “delay” in the implementation of the travel
restrictions due to litigation).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.; Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1167 (9th Cir. 2017) (admitting
the lack of authority “to . . . rewrite the Executive Order” since the executive branch
is “far better equipped to make appropriate distinctions”).
128. Robert S. Chang, Whitewashing Precedent: From the Chinese Exclusion
Case to Korematsu to the Muslim Travel Ban Cases, 68 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1183,
1189 (2018) (noting racial discrimination jurisprudence is “the strongest precedential
authority for President Trump’s executive actions” to enact travel restrictions against
Muslims).
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“expressly exclude[d] from the suspensions categories of aliens that
have prompted judicial concerns and which clarifie[d] or refine[d] the
approach to certain other issues or categories of affected aliens.” 129
These new justifications, explanations, and exemptions did not
guarantee the full enforcement of the new travel restrictions. Rather, a
new series of litigation began. 130 And again, the challengers to
President Trump won important victories in the courtroom. 131 The first
nationwide TRO blocking implementation of the new travel restrictions
was issued on March 15, 2017. In an opinion similar to Aziz, the district
court of Hawaii enjoined authorities from enforcing Sections 2 132 and 6
of the new Executive order, 133 one day before the new restrictions came
into effect. 134
In issuing the injunction, the court discussed the allegations of
Muslim discrimination behind the travel restrictions. Unlike the
decision in Louhghalam, which found the language in the Executive
order neutral to religion, 135 the district court of Hawaii concluded that:
[because] a reasonable, objective observer—enlightened by the
specific historical context, contemporaneous public statements, and
specific sequence of events leading to its issuance—would conclude
that the Executive Order was issued with a purpose to disfavor a
particular religion, in spite of its stated, religiously neutral purpose,

129. Exec. Order 13,780, supra note 35, at 13212.
130. See, e.g., Doe v. Trump, No. 17-CV-112-WMC, 2017 WL 975996, at *1
(W.D. Wis. Mar. 10, 2017) (granting a TRO in part and enjoining the authorities from
enforcing Exec. Order 13,780 in relation to the plaintiff).
131. See Nanda, supra note 36, at 318 (providing an overview of cases against
the new order).
132. With few exceptions, generally banning nationals of six predominately
Muslim majority countries from entering the United States. See Hawaii v. Trump, 241
F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1140 (D. Haw. 2017).
133. Section 6 of the new Executive Order concerned the temporary suspension
of admitting refugees to the United States. See id.
134. See id.; see also Exec. Order 13,780, supra note 35, at 13218 (Hawaii v.
Trump was decided on March 15, 2017, while Executive Order 13,780 had an
effective date of March 16, 2017).
135. Louhghalam v. Trump, 230 F. Supp. 3d 26, 35 (D. Mass. 2017).
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the Court finds that [challengers] are likely to succeed on the merits
of their Establishment Clause claim. 136

This conclusion informed how the court dealt with the Government’s
claim that the enacted travel ban was designed to meet neutral security
purposes.
The Government argued that the ban did not target the Islamic faith
or all Muslims around the globe, emphasizing the fact that the
restriction was limited to a specified number of countries. Addressing
this argument, the court said:
[this] illogic of the Government’s contentions is palpable. The notion
that one can demonstrate animus toward any group of people only by
targeting all of them at once is fundamentally flawed. The Court
declines to relegate its Establishment Clause analysis to a purely
mathematical exercise. . . . Equally flawed is the [argument] that the
Executive Order cannot be found to have targeted Islam because it
applies to all individuals in the six referenced countries. It is
undisputed, using the primary source upon which the Government
itself relies, that these six countries have overwhelmingly Muslim
populations . . . It would therefore be no paradigmatic leap to
conclude that targeting these countries likewise targets Islam.
Certainly, it would be inappropriate to conclude, as the Government
does, that it does not. 137

The court concluded that, by subjecting travelers from
predominately Muslim nations to prohibitions, the new travel ban again
singled out one specific religion for disfavored treatment. This
conclusion formed the legal underpinning of the court’s discussion of
the alleged violation of the Establishment Clause. 138 With reference to
136. Hawaii v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1134 (D. Haw. 2017) (granting
nationwide TRO).
137. Id. at 1135.
138. Id. at 1134. The Court used similar reasoning to note the main purpose of
the travel restriction was to single out Muslims for a special prohibition. See id. at
1137 (noting any “reasonable, objective observer would conclude . . . that the stated
secular purpose of the Executive Order is, at the very least, ‘secondary to a religious
objective’ of temporarily suspending the entry of Muslims” (citation omitted)). For
criticism of the court’s reasoning, see Elbert Lin, States Suing the Federal
Government: Protecting Liberty or Playing Politics?, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 633, 644
(2018).
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the political context in which the travel bans were issued, the court
found that challengers had rightly stated a violation of nonEstablishment.
According to the court, the political context
surrounding the travel restrictions clearly illustrated the true motivation
behind the bans: “religious animus.” 139 The “unrebutted evidence” of
this animus explained why the authorities had urged the court to focus
on the plain text of the order, rather than the broader political context.140
In the days after Hawaii, courts across the country granted temporary
injunctions on similar grounds, 141 blocking and freezing enforcement
of the enacted travel restrictions. 142 The administration’s response to
139. Hawaii v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1136 (D. Haw. 2017).
140. Id. (“[T]he historical background [of the travel restrictions] makes plain
why the Government wishes to focus on the Executive Order’s text, rather than its
context. The record before this Court is unique. It includes significant and unrebutted
evidence of religious animus driving the promulgation of the Executive Order and its
related predecessor.”).
141. See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539,
566 (D. Md. 2017) (granting nationwide preliminary injunction blocking enforcement
of § 2(c) Exec. Order 13,780, restricting the entry opportunities of nationals of six
predominantly Muslim majority countries), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 857 F.3d
554 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 198 L. Ed. 2d 643 (2017), and
vacated and remanded sub nom. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance, 138 S. Ct. 353,
199 L. Ed. 2d 203 (2017); Hawaii v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1239 (D. Haw.
2017) (granting nationwide preliminary injunction), hearing in banc denied sub nom.
Hawaii v. Trump, 864 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2017), and aff’d in part, vacated in part,
remanded sub nom. Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted sub
nom. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 198 L. Ed. 2d 643
(2017), and vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 377, 199 L. Ed. 2d 275 (2017), and
appeal dismissed as moot sub nom. Hawaii v. Trump, 874 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2017);
Hamama v. Adducci, No. 17-CV-11910, 2017 WL 2684477, at *3 (E.D. Mich. June
22, 2017) (granting TRO to stay the execution of removal); State v. Trump, 263 F.
Supp. 3d 1049, 1062–63 (D. Haw. 2017), aff’d, 871 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 2017) (granting
nationwide injunction against enforcement of travel restrictions—§§ 2(c), 6(a), and
6(b) Exec. Order 13,780—affecting close relatives, like grandparents, of people living
in the United States).
142. Contra Sarsour v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 719, 737–38 (E.D. Va. 2017)
(denying TRO that would enjoin authorities from enforcing the new travel restrictions,
holding that Executive Order is unreviewable under the Administrative Procedure
Act, and furthermore holding that the challengers were not to succeed under the
guarantees of the Establishment Clause: “the substantive revisions reflected in [the
new Executive Order] have reduced the probative value of the President’s statements
to the point that it is no longer likely that Plaintiffs can succeed on their claim that the
predominate purpose of [the new Executive Order] is to discriminate against Muslims
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these judicial developments was twofold. Put differently, the
administration played—like chess masters—on two boards at the same
time. First, the President used public debate to lash out at judges who
had voted against his travel restrictions, accusing them of endangering
the country and writing political judgments to aggrandize their own
power and influence. 143 Simultaneously, his team of lawyers and legal
advisors worked on a strategy to convince judges that the President had
the sole legal authority to make decisions regarding the admission of
aliens. 144 This double-faceted strategy is characteristic of the Trump
administration’s dealings with political disappointments, at least in the
area of regulating immigration. 145
However, these strategies did not immediately turn out to be the
legal game-changer the President had hoped they would be. Instead,
history repeated itself.
The nationwide injunctions—blocking
enforcement of key parts of the new travel suspension and restriction
regime—were largely upheld by the Fourth and Ninth Circuits. 146 Both
courts shared an important concern: the waning influence of the rule of

based on their religion and that [the new Executive Order] is a pretext or a sham for
that purpose.”).
143. See Elizabeth Thornburg, Twitter and the #So-CalledJudge, 71 S.M.U. L.
REV. 249, 265–68 (2018) (discussing how Trump has repeatedly attacked the judiciary
after a disappointing judgment and arguing that judges should use social media to
reach a broader audience); see also Alison Higgins Merrill, Nicholas D. Conway &
Joseph Daniel Ura, Confidence and Constraint: Public Opinion, Judicial
Independence, and the Roberts Court, 54 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 209, 223 (2017)
(pointing out that judges have little means to save their institution from political
attacks).
144. Tara Leigh Grove, The Origins (and Fragility) of Judicial Independence,
71 VAND. L. REV. 465, 501 (2018) (providing an overview of statements made by
President Trump to show his disagreement with the legal decisions issued against his
travel restrictions, also pointing to the Administration’s willingness to respect the
legal decisions and follow the appropriate appellate procedures).
145. Cf. Chacón, supra note 51, at 257.
146. International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 601 (4th
Cir. 2017) (holding, among others, that challengers were “likely to succeed on the
merits of their Establishment Clause claim.”); Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 761
(9th Cir. 2017) (holding, per curiam, among others, that challengers had “shown a
likelihood of success on the merits of [their INA-based statutory claim] and that the
district court’s preliminary injunction order can be affirmed in large part based on
statutory grounds[,]” but not addressing the challengers’ Establishment Clause
claims).
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law, which shaped a dangerous precedent for fact-free engagement in
politics. 147
Nevertheless, in Trump v. International Refugee Assistance
Project, President Trump gained an important victory on his way to
establishing his desired travel regime. 148 Equipped with this safeguard,
the President issued a new travel ban: Proclamation 9645, titled
Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted
Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety
Threats. 149 The President announced this new ban in September 2017,
just ninety days after receiving a partial stay of the issued injunctions.
C. Proclamation 9645
Like its predecessors, the new travel ban singled out nationals of
certain states for special travel restrictions. However, this ban was also
unique in some respects. Remarkably, the Proclamation did not contain
the stereotypes explicitly mentioned by its predecessors, namely, honor
killers and women abusers. Instead, the general focus was on protecting
the country from terrorism. 150

147. Renan, supra note 73, at 2259–60. See also Matthew R. Segal, America’s
Conscience: The Rise of Civil Society Groups Under President Trump, 65 UCLA L.
REV. 1574, 1579 (2018) (expecting that authorities will lose credibility because of
President Trump’s animus toward everything he dislikes and positing that if “the
federal government is . . . going to behave just like a landlord who won’t rent to Black
people, then it will command precisely the same level of respect.”).
148. Cf. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2090, 198
L. Ed. 2d 643 (2017) (Thomas, J., with whom Alito, J., and Gorsuch J., join concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (“I agree with the Court’s implicit conclusion that the
Government has made a strong showing that it is likely to succeed on the merits—that
is, that the judgments below will be reversed. The Government has also established
that failure to stay the injunctions will cause irreparable harm.”).
149. Proclamation 9645, supra note 35.
150. Id. (defending the need for this Proclamation as follows: “As President, I
must act to protect the security and interests of the United States and its people. I am
committed to our ongoing efforts to engage those countries willing to cooperate,
improve information-sharing and identity-management protocols and procedures, and
address both terrorism-related and public-safety risks. . . . I have determined, on the
basis of recommendations from the Secretary of Homeland Security and other
members of my Cabinet, to impose certain conditional restrictions and limitations . . .
on entry into the United States of nationals of the countries identified in section 2 of
this proclamation.”)
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Another important distinction between this Proclamation and its
predecessors concerns the durability of the latter. While the previous
versions were designed to temporarily suspend the entry of certain
nationals, the Proclamation had an indefinite character “to advance the
national security, foreign policy, and counterterrorism interests of the
United States.” 151 The only escape was through a recommendation to
the President to change the policies, following the outcomes of a review
every 180 days. 152 But more importantly, for the first time in the history
of President Trump’s travel restrictions, the Proclamation included
“non-Muslim” countries. This new ban added North Korea 153 and
Venezuela to the list of countries affected by the travel restrictions.154
Other states on this list included Iran, 155 Libya, 156 Somalia, 157 Syria,158
Yemen, 159 and Chad, which was removed from this list in April
2018. 160 Despite this most recent version of the travel ban including

151. Id. § 8 (also urging authorities to enforce the restrictions “to the maximum
extent possible”).
152. Id. § 4 (urging authorities to report “within 180 days, . . . and every 180
days thereafter” about the need to uphold the restrictions and if necessary to modify
them).
153. Id. § 2(d)(ii) (suspending all nonimmigrant and immigrant visas).
154. Id. § 2(f)(ii) (suspending “entry into the United States of officials of
government agencies of Venezuela involved in screening and vetting procedures . . .
and their immediate family members, as nonimmigrants on business (B-1), tourist (B2), and business/tourist (B-1/B-2) visas”). Officials “traveling on a diplomatic or
diplomatic-type visa” were excepted from this provision. See id. § 3(b)(v).
155. Id. § 2(b)(ii) (suspending all immigrant visas and all nonimmigrant visas,
except F, M, and J visas, instead subjecting those particular visa holders to enhanced
screening procedures).
156. Id. § 2(c)(ii) (suspending nonimmigrant B-1, B-2 and B-1/B-2 visas, and
suspending all immigrant visas).
157. Id. § 2(h)(ii) (suspending all immigrant visas, and putting nonimmigrant
visa applicants under “additional scrutiny to determine if [they] are connected to
terrorist organizations or otherwise pose a threat to the national security or public
safety.”).
158. Id. § 2(e)(ii) (suspending all nonimmigrant and immigrant visas).
159. Id. § 2(g)(ii) (suspending nonimmigrant B-1, B-2 and B-1/B-2 visas, and
suspending all immigrant visas).
160. Proclamation No. 9723, 83 Fed. Reg. 15937 (Apr. 13, 2018) (titled
Maintaining Enhanced Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted
Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats) (“[T]he
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some “non-Muslim” states and removing one Muslim majority country,
Sudan, the vast majority of the targeted states still consisted of places
with predominantly Muslim populations. 161 Furthermore, the addition
of Venezuela had a primarily symbolic significance, since most of its
nationals were not affected by the suspension. 162 Therefore, North
Korea was the only “non-Muslim” state that faced the same travel
restrictions as other predominantly-Muslim countries on the list. 163
The issuance of this new and indefinite travel ban has had two
important short-term effects. First, because Executive Order 13,780
expired on the date President Trump issued Proclamation 9645, the
Supreme Court vacated and remanded the cases it had previously
granted certiorari to hear. The Court instructed the Fourth and Ninth
Circuits to dismiss as moot those cases challenging the legality of the
travel restrictions. 164 Second, a new wave of legal challenges blocked
enforcement of the travel restrictions. Again, the likelihood of success
in challenging the travel restrictions regime on grounds that it
discriminates and violates the Establishment Clause played an
important role in courts granting nationwide injunctions. 165
entry into the United States of the nationals of Chad . . . no longer would be
detrimental to the interests of the United States . . . .”).
161. See Proclamation 9645, supra note 35, § 3 (listing exceptions and waivers
to be decided on a case-by-case basis).
162. See id. § 2(f)(ii).
163. See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570, 623
(D. Md. 2017) (“[T]he inclusion of two non-majority Muslim nations, North Korea
and Venezuela, does not persuasively show a lack of religious purpose behind the
Proclamation. The Venezuela ban is qualitatively different from the others because it
extends only to government officials, and the ban on North Korea [affects] fewer than
100 people . . . In short, the inclusion of Venezuela and North Korea in the
Proclamation has little practical consequence.”).
164. See Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance, 138 S. Ct. 353, L. Ed. 2d 203
(2017) (mem.); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 377, 199 L. Ed. 2d 275 (2017) (mem.).
See also W. Neil Eggleston & Amanda Elbogen, The Trump Administration and the
Breakdown of Intra-Executive Legal Process, 127 YALE L.J. F. 825, 831 (2018); Peter
Margulies, Bans, Borders, and Sovereignty: Judicial Review of Immigration Law in
the Trump Administration, 2018 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 50–51 (2018) (both providing a
brief timeline of the legal developments related to the travel restrictions).
165. See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570
(D. Md. 2017), aff’d, 883 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 2018), as amended, (Feb. 28, 2018), cert.
granted, judgment vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2710 (2018), and cert. granted, judgment
vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2710 (2018); State v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140 (D. Haw.
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After thoroughly analyzing the history and political context of the
imposed travel restrictions, the method adopted to select the countries
to be put under security scrutiny, and the language used to define the
restrictions, Judge Theodore Chuang stated:
there are substantial reasons to question whether the asserted national
security purpose has now indeed become the primary purpose. First,
the underlying architecture of the prior Executive Orders and the
Proclamation is fundamentally the same. Each of these executive
actions bans the issuance of immigrant and nonimmigrant visas on
the basis of nationality to multiple majority-Muslim countries on the
basis of concerns about terrorism. The Proclamation does not
abandon this fundamental approach, but rather doubles down on
it 166 . . . . [Hence,] the Court concludes that where the Proclamation
itself is not sufficiently independent of [its predecessors] to signal a
purposeful, persuasive change in the primary purpose of the travel
ban, and there were no other public signs that ‘‘as persuasively’’ as
the original violation established a different primary purpose for the
travel ban, it cannot find that a ‘‘reasonable observer’’ would
understand that the primary purpose of the Proclamation’s travel ban
is no longer the desire to impose a Muslim ban. 167

The sharpest judicial condemnation of Trump’s travel ban as a sign
of animosity toward Muslims and Islam followed a few months later.
In International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, the Fourth
Circuit held that the nationwide injunction was warranted only in
relation to “foreign nationals with a bona fide relationship with an
individual or entity in the United States.” 168 However, after a thorough
examination of “official statements from President Trump and other
2017), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted 138
S. Ct. 923 (2018), and rev’d and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
166. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570, 624 (D.
Md. 2017). Cf. State v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1157 (D. Haw. 2017) (critical
of the methodological justification behind the selection of the targeted countries,
concluding that “[the Proclamation’s] individualized country findings make no effort
to explain why some types of visitors from a particular country are banned, while
others are not”).
167. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 624, 628
(referring to McCreary C. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 545 U.S. 844, 872 (2005)).
168. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 271 (4th Cir.
2018).
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executive branch officials, along with the Proclamation itself,” the court
concluded that the ban was “unconstitutionally tainted with animus
toward Islam.” 169
This sharp conclusion about religious animosity—“evidenced by
official statements of the President . . . that graphically disparage the
Islamic faith and its practitioners” 170—came at a time when President
Trump was celebrating his most significant progress in dealing with the
legal challenges that had continuously delayed what he had promised
to his voters: enacting a travel ban. In December 2017, the Supreme
Court ordered to stay the granted preliminary injunctions pending
“disposition of the Government’s appeal . . . and disposition of the
Government’s petition for a writ of certiorari.” 171 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court urged the courts of appeal to reach their decisions “with
appropriate dispatch.” 172 In light of this order, the circuit courts decided
to stay their decisions pending the Supreme Court’s future decisions. 173
This order did not issue any limitations on the scope of the travel
restrictions, 174 and the Trump administration approached it as “a
substantial victory for the safety and security of the American
people.” 175 This timely victory advanced the President’s immigration
169. Id. at 256–57.
170. Id. at 353 (Harris, Cir. J., with whom Gribbon Motz, Cir. J., and King, Cir.
J., join, concurring).
171. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 138 S. Ct. 542 (2017) (mem.);
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 542 (2017) (mem.).
172. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 138 S. Ct. 542 (2017) (mem.);
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 542 (2017) (mem.).
173. See Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662, 702 (9th Cir. 2017); Int’l Refugee
Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 274 (4th Cir. 2018); see also Lauri Kai,
Embracing the Chinese Exclusion Case: An International Law Approach to Racial
Exclusions, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2617, 2621–22 (2018) (suggesting that
contemporary travel restrictions survive Supreme Court review because the “plenary
power doctrine” has made policies related to immigration and admission
“nonjusticiable.”).
174. See Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2088
(2017) (granting certioraris limited the scope of the enforcement to those who failed
to prove their bona fide relationship); but see Jeremy Martin, Trump v. International
Refugee Assistance Program 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017), 44 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 131, 142
(2018) (critical of this formula).
175. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Allows Trump Travel Ban to Take Effect,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/04/us/politics/trumptravel-ban-supreme-Court.html (quoting Attorney General Jeff Sessions).
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agenda, 176 and the administration began to enforce the travel
restrictions soon after the issuance of the stays. 177 Moreover, the
authorities continued to uphold the travel restrictions after the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in January 2018. 178 Consequently, the stay
order remained in effect pending the Supreme Court’s final decision.179
This decision came in June 2018, when the Supreme Court upheld
Proclamation 9645 in Trump v. Hawaii. 180
The Court’s opinion in this case was extraordinary, 181 and not
merely because of the animus toward one particular religion that
surrounded the case, 182 prompting today’s travel ban controversy to be
mentioned in the same breath as cases of racial exclusion from the dark
decades behind us. 183 No, Trump v. Hawaii is special because the
Supreme Court missed an opportunity to explain to its critics why the
176. See Josh Blackman, The Travel Bans, 2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 29, 30
(2017–2018) (arguing the stay order “was a conclusive indication that the lower courts
had gone astray”). Cf. Ratna Kapur, The Ayodhya Case: Hindu Majoritarianism and
the Right to Religious Liberty, 29 MD. J. INT’L L. 305, 311 (2014) (pointing out how
landmark decisions can advance political agendas).
177. See December 4, 2017 – Court Order on Presidential Proclamation, U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/visa-informationresources/presidential-proclamation-archive/2017-12-04-PresidentialProclamation.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2019).
178. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 923, 924, 199 L. Ed. 2d 620 (2018); see also
Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 138 S. Ct. 542, 542 (2018) (mem.).
179. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 138 S. Ct. 542 (2017) (mem.);
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 542 (2017) (mem.).
180. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).
181. Cf. Josh Chafetz & David E. Pozen, How Constitutional Norms Break
Down, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1430, 1453–54 (2018) (asserting the negative assessment
the travel ban has received fits a broader tendency, in which other branches of power
show their serious disagreement with President Trump’s violation of important
(unwritten) norms).
182. See Emily C. Callan, A Funny Thing Happened on My Way to the
Border . . . How the Recent Immigration Executive Orders and Subsequent Lawsuits
Demonstrate the Immediate Need for Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 47 U.
BALT. L. REV. 1, 11 (2017) (writing that this case “entered a new realm of
jurisprudence” by considering statements made by President Trump on the campaign
trail).
183. Cf. Shawn E. Fields, The Unreviewable Executive: National Security and
the Limits of Plenary Power, 84 TENN. L. REV. 731, 753 (2017); David S. Rubenstein
& Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Immigration Exceptionalism, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 583,
594–95 (2017).
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travel ban case was so different from other recent controversies
concerning religious discrimination and religious neutrality, such as the
Masterpiece Cakeshop case. 184
Before discussing this point of criticism further, we must first
explore the arguments set forth in Trump v. Hawaii denying the
unconstitutionality of the most recent travel ban. We will then turn to
a criticism of double standards, analyzing how the Court has responded
differently to those officials’ statements showing hostility toward
religion. Finally, we will briefly highlight the argument that authorities
should always be mindful of the constitutional tradition, the freedoms
guaranteed, and the impact their actions might have on society, as
powerfully advocated by concurring Justice Kennedy. 185
1. Trump v. Hawaii
On June 26, 2018, Chief Justice Roberts delivered the majority
opinion ruling on the lawfulness of President Trump’s latest travel
ban. 186 Although the Court dispatched this case barely two months after
hearing oral arguments, the 5-4 vote was a clear indication of the
Court’s contrasting views. The highly divided Supreme Court upheld
Proclamation 9645 on the grounds that: (1) the Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”) allows the President to deny entry to aliens
when their admission would harm the interests of the United States;187
(2) the non-discrimination provision of the INA relating to the issuance
of visas does not alter the right of the President to deny aliens entry to
184. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Com’n, 138 S. Ct.
1719 (2018). See Leslie Kendrick & Micah Schwartzman, The Etiquette of Animus,
132 HARV. L. REV. 133, 135–36 (2018) (blaming the Supreme Court for not providing
sufficient standards for handling cases concerning religious discrimination and
criticizing the Court for delivering contradictory opinions in Masterpiece and Trump
v. Hawaii, both touching upon animosity toward religion and discrimination);
Brandon L. Garrett, Unconstitutionally Illegitimate Discrimination, 104 VA. L. REV.
1471, 1516 (2018) (“Perhaps Justice Sotomayor is correct that the majority in Trump
v. Hawaii could not defend the presidential expressions of animus, so instead ignored
that aspect of the analysis and ruled based on deference to the executive branch on
issues of immigration and national security.”).
185. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423–24 (2018) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
186. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
187. Id. at 2408–10 (referencing Immigration and Nationality Act § 1182(f)).
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the United States; 188 (3) the travel ban might be rationally related to its
purported goal, namely national security; 189 and (4) the ban did not
violate the Establishment Clause. 190 For purposes of this article, we
will limit our analysis to the Court’s discussion of the travel ban’s
constitutionality in light of the First Amendment’s Establishment
Clause.
The Supreme Court began this discussion by outlining the factors
it would consider in assessing the lawfulness of the travel ban. First,
the Court clarified that its task was not to denounce what the President
had said, but rather to protect the authority of the Presidency and the
legitimacy of the Executive power. Thus, what the President has said
needs to be assessed in light of what exercising his Executive power
entails. That was the main focus of the Court, since the travel
restrictions addressed “a matter [that fell] within the core of executive
The Court further stated that this case is
responsibility.” 191
fundamentally different than other non-Establishment guarantee
litigation because the issued Proclamation touched upon issues of
national security, drawing on entirely religion-neutral language. 192
“Conventional” Establishment Clause cases, however, typically discuss
the lawfulness of authorities’ endorsing religion in public. 193
With this background in mind, the Court reiterated that matters of
admission and removal of aliens fall under the authority of the executive
and legislative branches, insulating this specific issue from judicial
scrutiny. 194 The Court explained that those branches are better
informed to make such decisions because “decisions in these matters
may implicate ‘relations with foreign powers,’ or involve
‘classifications defined in the light of changing political and economic
circumstances.’” 195 However, when admission questions implicate the
constitutional rights of United States citizens, it may provide reason for

188. Id. at 2414–15.
189. Id. at 2423.
190. Id. at 2420.
191. Id. at 2418.
192. Id.
193. Id. (noting “typical” Establishment Clause cases involve religious displays
or school prayer).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 2418–19 (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976)).
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the Court to put such cases under scrutiny. 196 Yet this does not alter the
legal authority given to the executive and legislative branches to make
decisions concerning the admission of aliens. In other words, those
branches retain the final say. That is also the case “when the Executive
exercises this [delegated] power negatively on the basis of a facially
legitimate and bona fide reason, the Courts will neither look behind the
exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification,” in
light of the Constitutional rights of United States citizens.197
Further, the Court approaches cases of national security with the
highest possible cautiousness, given the authority and information the
President has regarding such cases. The majority noted that applying
the conventional inquiry—that is, asking whether the adopted policy
was facially legitimate and bona fide—“would put an end to our
review.” 198 However, following the suggestion of the Government, the
Court delved beyond the ban’s facially neutral appearance. 199 In this
respect, the Court drew upon its rational basis doctrine to assess the
lawfulness of the travel ban in light of the Establishment Clause. The
Court “may consider . . . extrinsic evidence [as submitted by the
challengers to the travel restrictions], but will uphold the policy so long
as it can reasonably be understood to result from a justification
independent of unconstitutional grounds.” 200
In other words, the rational basis doctrine does not help opponents
of the travel restrictions to halt a policy that pursues a legitimate
government interest. To illustrate this point, the majority referred to “a
few occasions” where the Court has invalidated policies that were
clearly harmful. 201 In Romer v. Evans, for instance, the Supreme Court
struck down a state amendment that clearly discriminated against nonheterosexuals, depriving them of the right to access anti-discrimination
196. Id. at 2419 (“[A]lthough foreign nationals seeking admission have no
constitutional right to entry, this Court has engaged in a circumscribed judicial inquiry
when the denial of a visa allegedly burdens the constitutional rights of a U.S. citizen.”)
(quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 756–57 (1972)).
197. Id. at 2419.
198. Id. at 2420.
199. Id.
200. Id.; see also Sorkin, supra note 80 (discussing “extrinsic evidence”).
201. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420 (2018) (noting the Court has
invalidated policies that appear to have been implemented for no other purpose than
a “bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group” (citation omitted)).
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laws. 202 The Court’s limited precedent in striking down laws and
policies that do not pursue a legitimate governmental interest provided
little guidance here. However, the Court concluded that the travel ban
regime did not share such characteristics with cases like Romer to
warrant invalidating the Proclamation. 203 Chief Justice Roberts stated:
[the] Proclamation is expressly premised on legitimate purposes:
preventing entry of nationals who cannot be adequately vetted and
inducing other nations to improve their practices. The text says
nothing about religion. [Challengers to the Proclamation]
nonetheless emphasize that five of the seven nations currently
included in the Proclamation have Muslim-majority populations. Yet
that fact alone does not support an inference of religious hostility,
given that the policy covers just 8% of the world’s Muslim
population and is limited to countries that were previously
designated by Congress or prior administrations as posing national
security risks. 204

The Supreme Court also saw no reason to invalidate the
Proclamation on the ground that it lacked effectiveness, as posited by
the challengers. The Court could not properly evaluate the content of
that argument, since the effectiveness question involved complicated
matters that were better suited for the executive branch. Put differently,
the Court was not in a position to “substitute [its] own assessment for
the Executive’s predictive judgments on [security] matters.” 205 The
fact that the Government had removed three predominantly-Muslim
countries from the list of affected countries further reaffirmed the view
that the Proclamation pursued a legitimate security interest. 206
Furthermore, the Court reasoned, the Proclamation included
“significant exceptions” and waiver programs for those nationals
affected by the restrictions. 207
Despite the majority noting the Court would not denounce any
political statements made by the President in the context of the travel
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632–36 (1996).
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420–21 (2018).
Id. at 2421.
Id.
Id. at 2422.
Id.
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bans, it nevertheless bitterly denounced any comparison between the
contemporary travel bans and the Supreme Court’s decision in
Korematsu v. United States concerning the lawfulness of forced
relocations based on race and national origin. Opponents of the travel
bans had suggested that the restrictions rested on the same narrative
present in Korematsu—namely, anxiety toward a specific group of
people that ultimately resulted in singling them out for a cruel relocation
policy. 208 The majority vigorously denounced this comparison, saying:
Korematsu has nothing to do with this case. The forcible relocation
of U.S. citizens to concentration camps, solely and explicitly on the
basis of race, is objectively unlawful and outside the scope of
Presidential authority. But it is wholly inapt to liken that morally
repugnant order to a facially neutral policy denying certain foreign
nationals the privilege of admission. . . . The entry suspension is an
act that is well within executive authority and could have been taken
by any other President—the only question is evaluating the actions
of this particular President in promulgating an otherwise valid
Proclamation. 209

The majority went a step further in conveying its disdain toward
Korematsu, stating the decision “was gravely wrong the day it was
decided, has been overruled in the court of history, and—to be clear—
‘has no place in law under the Constitution.’” 210
The Court concluded that the Government had met its burden to
demonstrate the Proclamation pursued a legitimate government
interest—security protection—which is itself a rational and justified
ground to limit the entry of certain nationals. Finding that the
Proclamation survived rational basis review, the Supreme Court
reversed the lower court’s judgment granting the preliminary
injunction. 211

208.
(1944).
209.
210.
211.

Id. at 2423. See generally Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2423.
Id. (quoting Justice Jackson’s dissenting opinion in Korematsu).
Id.
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2. The Façade of Security Concerns and Double Standards
While Trump v. Hawaii reaffirmed the Government’s argument
that the Proclamation pursued a legitimate aim, one major criticism of
the travel ban is that it is politically motivated and fulfills President
Trump’s promise to implement a Muslim ban, instead of actually
dealing with national security concerns. 212 Critics maintain the travel
ban lacks a bona fide justification, arguing that it instead rests primarily
on stereotypes about immigrants. 213
However, stereotyping
immigrants—varying from job-hunters to terrorists—has proven to be
a successful method for justifying exclusionary politics today and in the
past. 214
Another criticism of the travel ban case is that the Supreme Court’s
majority opinion applied double standards. It was uncritical toward the
President’s remarks about Muslims both during the election and after
he took office, but critical toward officials’ statements discrediting
majoritarian religious sensitivities. For example, the Court considered
the President’s statements toward Muslims irrelevant for purposes of
assessing the travel ban, but the “hostile” religious statements of a local
civil rights commissioner were found decisive for the Court’s
assessment of a First Amendment claim in Masterpiece Cakeshop. 215
212. See, e.g., Wadhia, supra note 63, at 1502–06. The “disconnect” between a
neutral defense of the ban (security concerns) and its political presentation (a Muslim
ban) puzzled courts in how to approach the travel bans. See Katherine Shaw, Beyond
the Bully Pulpit: Presidential Speech in the Courts, 96 TEX. L. REV. 71, 124 (2017).
213. Cf. Leti Volpp, Protecting the Nation from “Honor Killings”: The
Construction of a Problem, 34 CONST. COMMENT. 133, 169 (2019) (arguing that
“[the] specter of violence against women has played an important role in the Trump
administration’s executive orders seeking to bar Muslims from entry, and continues
to rationalize the notion that the nation must be protected through their exclusion. Yet
this submerged story has been largely overlooked.”).
214. Critics have placed the contemporary travel bans in the category of
exclusionary policies that have historically singled out specific groups of immigrants
for special bans. See, e.g., Chang, supra note 128; Kai, supra note 173; Michael
Kagan, Is the Chinese Exclusion Case Still Good Law? (The President Is Trying to
Find Out), 1 NEV. L.J. F. 80 (2017).
215. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct.
1719, 1731 (2018); see also Jessica A. Clarke, Explicit Bias, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 505,
515–16 (2018) (criticizing the Court for being overtly protective toward majoritarian
beliefs and sensitives, while indifferent toward similar claims for protection coming
from minority groups); Thomas C. Berg, Masterpiece Cakeshop: A Romer for
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These two major points of criticism—the façade of security
concerns behind the travel ban and the presence of double standards—
are further discussed in light of Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion
in Trump v. Hawaii, which dispatches each of these concerns
thoroughly. Justice Sotomayor stated that “repackaging” the promise
of enacting a “total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the
United States” as a matter of national security “does little to cleanse
Presidential Proclamation No. 9645 of the appearance of discrimination
that the President’s words have created.” 216
Justice Sotomayor further suggested that “behind [the] facade of
national security concerns” existed fear of the stranger in general and
of the Muslim migrant in particular. 217 This is reflected in the obvious
presence of animus toward Muslims that drove the President to issue
travel bans singling out Muslims in the first place. This hostile
language toward Muslims has always surrounded the travel bans and
plainly contradicts the guarantee of neutrality toward religion enshrined
in the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Furthermore, a
historical review of the emergence of travel bans in the Trump era
complicates the argument that the travel bans were not issued to target
Muslims. It was therefore regrettable, according to Justice Sotomayor,
that the majority limited its review to the plain text of the
Proclamation. 218
To properly evaluate the challengers’ Establishment Clause claim,
it is necessary, according to Justice Sotomayor, to review the statements
of the President as a whole. It is this “full record [of statements that]
paints a far more harrowing picture [than the one we may discern on the
basis of the majority judgment], from which a reasonable observer
would readily conclude that the Proclamation was motivated by
hostility and animus toward the Muslim faith” 219 instead of pressing

Religious Objectors, 2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 139, 168 (2017–2018) (saying that in
general “majoritarian branches are insensitive to particular free-exercise claims” and
urging the Court to mind this unfortunate circumstance in its decisions). See generally
Frank S. Ravitch, The Supreme Court’s Rhetorical Hostility: What is Hostile to
Religion Under the Establishment Clause?, 2004 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1031 (2004).
216. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2433 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 2435.
219. Id.
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security needs. 220 This is exacerbated, according to Justice Sotomayor,
by the fact that President Trump has never rectified his bold statements,
despite his many opportunities to do so.221 Instead of offering a
different justification for the relationship between the travel restrictions
and the Muslim faith, to make the national security claim more
plausible to the objective observer, the President has continued his
infamous attacks on the Muslim community. 222
Referencing the majority decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop—
decided just weeks before Trump v. Hawaii—Justice Sotomayor called
it striking that the Court found “less pervasive official expressions of
hostility and the failure to disavow them to be Constitutionally
significant.” 223 Why the Court chose not to draw the same line in the
travel ban case was “perplexing.” 224 This difference in treatment leaves
an unsatisfactory feeling. While local officials were held “accountable”
for the impact of their statements about religion in Masterpiece
Cakeshop, the majority declined to apply the same standard in this
case. 225 But, as Justice Sotomayor indicated, both cases questioned
“whether a government actor exhibited tolerance and neutrality in
reaching a decision that affects individuals’ fundamental religious
freedom.” 226
The majority’s choice to exclude the President’s statements from
its legal assessment—while operating opposite to Masterpiece
Cakeshop, a case concerning majoritarian sensitives 227—is a disservice
to adherents of minority religions. Justice Sotomayor concluded that
220. Id. at 2438.
221. Id. at 2439.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 2441 (however, Justice Sotomayor uses the term “perplexing” to
criticize the choice of the majority to apply rational basis doctrine in assessing the
lawfulness of the Proclamation. This is a “perplexing” choice because the Court has
historically applied “a more stringent” test in Establishment Clause cases, especially
ones about animosity toward religion. This major difference in deciding similar cases
justifies our choice to quote “perplexing.”).
225. Id. at 2447.
226. Id.
227. Cf. Nora Olabi, “We Told You So”: Conservatives Use Masterpiece
(Jun.
5,
2018),
Decision
to
Energize
Base,
WESTWORD
https://www.westword.com/news/colorado-republicans-use-masterpiece-cakeshopCourt-decision-to-rally-support-for-november-elections-10377635.
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applying double standards in apparently similar cases “erodes the
foundational principles of religious tolerance that the Court elsewhere
has so emphatically protected, and it tells members of minority
religions in our country” that they are not equally entitled to the same
rights and privileges as those who belong to the majority. 228
3. The Freedom to Disregard the Constitutional Tradition
Justice Sotomayor’s criticism of the Court’s decision in Trump v.
Hawaii primarily concerned President Trump’s remarks, his decision
not to rectify those remarks, and his continued hostility toward
members of the Islamic minority in the United States. While the
majority excluded President Trump’s remarks from their analysis,
concurring Justice Kennedy noted that public statements made by the
executive branch may have significant societal consequences. 229
Justice Kennedy cautioned that although such statements are often “not
subject to judicial scrutiny or intervention,” this does not allow
government officials “to disregard the Constitution and the rights it
proclaims and protects.” 230 Officials have broad discretion free from
judicial scrutiny, but it is this freedom that “makes it all the more
imperative for [government officials] to adhere to the Constitution and
to its meaning and its promise.” 231
Justice Kennedy applied this concept of public manners to First
Amendment controversies. Because the Constitution guarantees the
freedoms of religion and expression and simultaneously prohibits the
Government from establishing any religion,
[it is] an urgent necessity that officials adhere to these Constitutional
guarantees and mandates in all their actions, even in the sphere of
foreign affairs. An anxious world must know that our Government

228. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2433, 2447 (2018) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
229. Id. at 2424 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 2423–24 (also positing that the shared point of view in Trump v.
Hawaii is that officials’ statements can be subjected to judicial scrutiny when such
statements spread hostility toward, for example, religion, but that the scope of putting
authorities’ statements under judicial scrutiny is quite limited and reserved to
extraordinary circumstances).
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remains committed always to the liberties the Constitution seeks to
preserve and protect, so that freedom extends outward, and lasts. 232

In a forceful plea, Justice Kennedy urged authorities to be mindful of
the constitutional tradition, the freedoms and constraints guaranteed,
and the impact their actions might have, both internally and externally.
The public appearance of authorities should attest to the rich
constitutional tradition of freedom and neutrality. 233
While Justice Kennedy did not apply his framework of public
manners explicitly to the travel ban case, and specifically to President
Trump’s remarks about Muslims, his unambiguous message of minding
the Constitution while exercising power raises the following questions:
how should we appraise President Trump’s travel ban project? What
does President Trump’s rhetorical attack on Muslims tell us? Does the
President’s disregard for the Constitution, in terms of explicitly
questioning the reliability of one group of people, namely Muslims,234
indicate that the United States has entered into a completely new era of
hatred and racial discrimination? 235
The President has almost unlimited discretionary authority, and
thus power, to deny aliens entry into the United States. 236 This is what
Trump v. Hawaii tells us. And although it might be empirically right
for the President to possess unlimited power to decide questions of
admission, we must ask whether it is justified for the President to
exclude categories of people. We must ask whether the President
should be allowed to continue—unrestrained—to insult adherents of
one religion, portraying them, for example, as a dangerous group, 237
who are unreliable, ill-mannered, uncivilized, honor killers, rapists,

232. Id. at 2424.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 2437–42 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (discussing at length the record
of anti-Muslim statements made by President Trump).
235. Cf. Eric K. Yamamoto, Maria Amparo Vanaclocha Berti & Jaime Tokioka,
“Loaded Weapon” Revisited: The Trump Era Import of Justice Jackson’s Warning in
Korematsu, 24 ASIAN AM. L.J. 5, 6 (2017) (noting the “[Trump] era is tarnished by
accelerating Muslim harassment and discrimination”).
236. See generally Barrow, supra note 65.
237. Cf. 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2433–47 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (providing
an overview of President Trump’s anti-Muslim statements, both during his
presidential campaign and after assuming office).
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ticking time bombs, and harmful to American society. 238 It is the desire
to exclude this group of individuals that has ultimately driven the
President to enact a series of travel bans. 239
II. SAVE OUR STATE FROM ISLAM
A historical analysis of President Trump’s travel ban project
suggests his focus on border protection was mainly concerned with who
is entering the country—drawing on stereotypes and ultimately
ordering a series of facially neutral travel restrictions targeting one
specific group of people. However, concerns about who is living in the
United States have similarly disfavored the American Muslim
community. For example, headscarves and beards kept for religious
purposes have, for some, caused trouble in the workplace. 240 Similar
troubles arise in relation to plans to build mosques or Islamic centers.
One particularly controversial example of this is the plan to build a
multi-faith center close to Ground Zero in New York, popularly known
as the “Ground Zero Mosque” by opponents of the project. 241 Another
consequence of the stereotypes surrounding the Muslim immigrant

238. Cf. Khaled A. Beydoun, Islamophobia: Toward a Legal Definition and
Framework, 116 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 108, 111 (2016) (arguing that stereotypes
are a driving factor behind policies that specifically target Muslims).
239. See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Terrorists Are Always Muslim but Never
White: At the Intersection of Critical Race Theory and Propaganda, 86 FORDHAM L.
REV. 455, 481 (2017) (describing the enacted travel restrictions as “Trump’s attempt
to fulfill his campaign promise to bar Muslims from entering the country”).
240. See, e.g., Kelly A. Harrison, Hiding Under the Veil of “Dress Policy”:
Muslim Women, Hijab, and Employment Discrimination in the United States, 17 GEO.
J. GENDER & L. 831 (2016); Cheryl A. Sharp, Sweet Land of Liberty: Islamophobia
and the Treatment of Muslims in the State of Connecticut, 11 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J.
221 (2012); Deborah L. Rhode, The Injustice of Appearance, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1033
(2009) (all referring to controversies at work because of a religious appearance).
241. Cf. Nicholas A. Primrose, Has Society Become Tolerant of Further
Infringement on First Amendment Rights?, 19 BARRY L. REV. 313, 317–20 (2013);
Heather Greenfield, International Law, Religious Limitations, and Cultural
Sensitivity: The Park51 Mosque at Ground Zero, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1317,
1319–22 (2011); Aziz Z. Huq, Private Religious Discrimination, National Security,
and the First Amendment, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 347, 353–55 (2011).
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population appears in the form of legal initiatives prohibiting the use of
Sharia law in the United States. 242
How can we rationalize policies that target a very specific group of
people? Particularly, how can we rationalize those policies that target
adherents of an unpopular religion, or those who come from regions
associated with such religions? How can we understand the Supreme
Court’s majority decision to uphold a policy obviously condoning
hatred and animus toward one group of people? Oklahoma’s urgent
plea to save their State from Islamic law 243 suggests President Trump’s
exclusionary politics are not accidental. Rather, these policies share the
same historical background of exclusion and are rooted in a narrative
of fear—fear of the non-white stranger in general and fear of the
Muslim in particular. Fear has proven to be a useful breeding ground
for policies of exclusion and reprisal in the United States. 244 Part II of
this article discusses Oklahoma’s Save Our State Amendment and
determines that, like the President’s travel ban project, Oklahoma’s
amendment emanates from feelings of fear and animus toward the
stranger. 245 This analysis will be used in Part III to uncover some of
the possible myths driving policymakers to design such exclusionary
policies.

242. See generally Asma T. Uddin & Dave Pantzer, A First Amendment
Analysis of Anti-Sharia Initiatives, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 363 (2012).
243. Cf. Ross Johnson, A Monolithic Threat: The Anti-Sharia Movement and
America’s Counter-Subversive Tradition, 19 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.
183, 191 (2012) (describing how the American anti-Sharia movement presents the
fight against Sharia law in the United States as an “existential conflict”).
244. See Beydoun, supra note 238, at 114. See generally NUSSBAUM, supra note
44.
245. John M. Bickers, False Facts and Holy War: How the Supreme Court’s
Establishment Clause Cases Fuel Religious Conflict, 51 IND. L. REV. 305, 332 (2018);
Hilal Elver, Racializing Islam Before and After 9/11: From Melting Pot to
Islamophobia, 21 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 162 (2012) (both pointing
to the role fear plays in pushing anti-Sharia initiatives forward).

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,

51

California Western Law Review, Vol. 56 [], No. 1, Art. 6
Wahedi camera ready FINAL (Do Not Delete)

186

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

1/30/2020 10:25 AM

[Vol. 56

A. State Question 755
In November 2010, Oklahoma residents participated in a ballot
initiative aimed to single out Sharia law for a special ban. 246 This
proposal, colloquially titled the Save Our State Amendment, asked
Oklahomans via State Question 755 whether they agreed with a ban on
the use of international law and Sharia law in Oklahoma courts. 247 The
proposal defined Sharia law as “Islamic law . . . based on two principal
sources, the Koran and the teaching of Mohammed.” 248 More than 70%
of voters agreed with the ban. 249
Rex Duncan, a primary proponent of this initiative, defended this
amendment as an absolute necessity in the “war for the survival of
America.” 250 Duncan stated that, contrary to Muslims:
Oklahomans recognize that America was founded on JudeoChristian principles . . . [a]nd State Question 755, the Save Our State
Amendment, is just a simple effort to ensure that our Courts are not
used to undermine those founding principles and turn Oklahoma into
something that our founding fathers and our great-grandparents
wouldn’t recognize. 251

246. Sarah Topy, Sharia Law in the Sooner State and Beyond: How the First
Amendment Impacts the Future of Anti-Sharia Law Statutes, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 617,
641 (2011).
247. H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52nd Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 1(B) & 1(C) (Okla. 2010)
(transcript available at https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/questions/755.pdf) (last
visited Feb. 15, 2019).
248. Id.
249. Penny M. Venetis, The Unconstitutionality of Oklahoma’s SQ 755 and
Other Provisions like It that Bar State Courts from Considering International Law,
59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 189, 190 (2011) (the proposal aimed to amend Oklahoma’s
Constitution in a way that prohibited courts from making use of international law,
Sharia law, or “the precepts of other nations or cultures”).
250. NUSSBAUM, supra note 44, at 11; Uddin & Pantzer, supra note 242, at 368.
See also Justin R. Long, State Constitutions as Interactive Expressions of
Fundamental Values, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1739, 1744–45 (2010) (discussing how the ban
was defended by proponents in the public discourse).
251. Lee Tankle, The Only Thing We Have to Fear Is Fear Itself: Islamophobia
and the Recently Proposed Unconstitutional and Unnecessary Anti-Religion Laws, 21
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 273, 284 (2012) (quoting Rex Duncan in defense of the
anti-Sharia proposal); see also Amara S. Chaudhry-Kravitz, The New Facially Neutral
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This fallaciously gallant rhetoric unveiled the true motivation
behind State Question 755: fear of the stranger, in this case Muslims.
But this animus toward Muslims and their customs had deeper roots,
grounded in majoritarian sensitivities about who Oklahomans were and
where their sentiments were coming from. Specifically, this animus
stemmed from the idea that the Judeo-Christian character of Oklahoma
needed protection from a serious threat coming from outside the state
and even outside the country—those individuals who did not share the
majoritarian narrative about who Oklahomans are. In other words,
Oklahoma was clearly being threatened by Muslims and their
customs, 252 and something had to be done. 253
Apparently, for individuals like Rex Duncan:
[when] it comes to Christian religious values, their potential
inconsistency with democracy, equality, and tolerance is never in
doubt, revealing sharply the degree to which [their] line of
[reasoning] rests not on a thoroughgoing rationalist secularism but
on a political theology of Christian democracy in which the identity
of democratic values with an imagined Christian civilizational
tradition is unquestioned. 254

Anti-Shariah Bills: A Constitutional Analysis, 20 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC.
JUST. 25, 31 (2013).
252. Carlo A. Pedrioli, Constructing the Other: U.S. Muslims, Anti-Sharia Law,
and the Constitutional Consequences of Volatile Intercultural Rhetoric, 22 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 65, 69–72 (2012) (analyzing why those who are outside the immigrant
group fear immigrants and their rituals).
253. See Ali, supra note 37, at 1065–66.
254. Nehal Bhuta, Two Concepts of Religious Freedom in the European Court
of Human Rights, 113 S. ATLANTIC Q. 9, 26 (2014) (admittedly, the quote is a critique
on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights related to the assessment
of laws targeting Muslims. However, this quote covers precisely what is so
problematic about the Oklahoma case and its progeny). For criticism of the United
States that fits the critical analysis of Nehal Bhuta, see Mark C. Rahdert,
Exceptionalism Unbound: Appraising American Resistance to Foreign Law, 65
CATH. U. L. REV. 537, 558 (2016) (arguing that singling out Sharia law for a special
ban at least implies that the Judeo-Christian legal tradition is not entitled to the same
amount of disfavor); Robert L. McFarland, Are Religious Arbitration Panels
Incompatible with Law? Examining “Overlapping Jurisdictions” in Private Law, 4
FAULKNER L. REV. 367, 371 (2013) (addressing the hypocrisy of those who defend
religious arbitration but keep Muslims from the same privilege). Cf. Najmeh
Mahmoudjafari, Religion and Family Law: The Possibility of Pluralistic Cooperation,
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B. Disfavoring Muslims
The approval of State Question 755 by Oklahoma voters was
immediately challenged by Muneer Awad, the executive director of
Oklahoma’s chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations. 255
On November 9, 2010, the district court granted Awad a preliminary
injunction, enjoining the Oklahoma State Board of Elections from
certifying the election outcomes. 256 The court found Awad had
successfully demonstrated the criteria needed to grant the preliminary
injunction. Specifically, Awad had demonstrated a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits of his First Amendment claims and
that he would suffer from irreparable harm if his request for an
injunction was denied. 257 Furthermore, the balance of hardship and
public interests advocated for the issuance of an injunction in this
case. 258
The district court was especially concerned about the consequences
of the special disfavor to Sharia law. The court found:
[Awad] has sufficiently set forth a personal stake in this action by
alleging that he lives in Oklahoma, is a Muslim, that the amendment
conveys an official government message of disapproval and hostility
toward his religious beliefs, that sends a clear message he is an
outsider, not a full member of the political community, thereby
chilling his access to the government and forcing him to curtail his
political and religious activities.259

82 UMKC L. REV. 1077, 1085 (2014) (wondering whether similar exceptions made
for the Jewish community relating to religious arbitration could also be made for
Muslims).
255. John T. Parry, Oklahoma’s Save Our State Amendment: Two Issues for the
Appeal, 64 OKLA. L. REV. 161, 161 (2012).
256. Venetis, supra note 249, at 198 (providing an overview and timeline of the
proceedings).
257. Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1307 (W.D. Okla. 2010), aff’d, 670
F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012).
258. Id. at 1308 (holding that “[while] the public has an interest in the will of
the voters being carried out, for the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that the
public has a more profound and long-term interest in upholding an individual’s
constitutional rights.”).
259. Id. at 1303.
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Similarly, the district court disavowed the argument that Oklahoma’s
amendment concerned a permissible choice of law. 260 In finding the
amendment explicitly singled out Sharia Law for disfavor, the court
said:
[the] amendment creates two independent restrictions on use/
consideration of Sharia Law: (1) the amendment requires that
Oklahoma courts “shall not consider . . . Sharia Law”, and (2) the
amendment allows Oklahoma courts to use/consider the law of
another state of the United States but only if “the other state does not
include Sharia Law.’’ No other ‘‘legal precepts of other nations or
cultures” is similarly restricted with respect to the law of another
state. 261

More fundamentally, the court agreed with Awad’s argument that
Sharia is not only a legal system, but a way of life “that [provides]
guidance to [Awad] and other Muslims regarding the exercise of their
faith.” 262
The Attorney General of Oklahoma appealed the preliminary
injunction, 263 but the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed
the district court’s decision in January 2012. 264 On appeal, members of
the Oklahoma State Board of Elections argued that Awad had not
suffered actual harm because the adopted amendment was not yet in
effect when he initiated his lawsuit. Neither had the rule limiting the
use of Sharia law been implemented in any Oklahoma court. Therefore,
appellants contended, Awad’s action rested merely on hypothetical
risks. 265 The appellate court rejected this line of reasoning, finding the
260. Cf. Kimberly Karseboom, Sharia Law and America: The Constitutionality
of Prohibiting the Consideration of Sharia Law in American Courts, 10 GEO. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 663, 675 (2012) (defending the line that “[if] Sharia is a legal system,
then the Oklahoma voters had every right to ban its consideration in state courts. It is
conceivable that the legislators included the portion about Sharia Law in the Save Our
State Amendment because, as a legal system, it is not covered under the doctrine of
the Establishment Clause and its subsequent cases. In any event, Oklahoma voters had
the right to decide which types of law could be considered in their state courts.”).
261. Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1306 (W.D. Okla. 2010).
262. Id.
263. Venetis, supra note 249, at 199.
264. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1133 (10th Cir. 2012).
265. Id. at 1120.
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fear of exclusion and “disfavored treatment” that had driven Awad to
file the suit was not based on speculation. 266 The ban would have been
enacted a week after the voters’ approval. The court concluded the
injunction was warranted, finding the four prongs of the injunction
test—a successful claim, the balance of harms, irreparable injury, and
public interests—weighed in Awad’s favor. 267
In discussing the alleged violation of the Establishment Clause, the
appellate court drew on the Larson test, 268 due to the obviously
discriminatory nature of the Save Our State Amendment. In this
respect, the court noted:
[the] amendment bans only one form of religious law—Sharia law.
Even if we accept Appellants’ argument that we should interpret
“cultures” to include “religions,” the text does not ban all religious
laws. The word “other” in the amendment modifies both “nations”
and “cultures.” Therefore, if we substituted the word “religions” for
“cultures,” the amendment would prohibit Oklahoma courts from
“look[ing] to the legal precepts of other . . . religions.” The word
“other” implies that whatever religions the legislature considered to
be part of domestic or Oklahoma culture would not have their legal
precepts prohibited from consideration, while all others would. Thus,
the second portion of the amendment that mentions Sharia law also
discriminates among religions. 269

The Tenth Circuit’s discussion of the existence of any concrete
justification for the ban on Sharia law is meaningful not only for the
greater legal debate concerning the presence or absence of a compelling
state interest to pursue the ban, but also for its analysis of the real
reasons behind the ban. 270 This analysis again revealed strong feelings
of animus toward Muslims and their customs. Consequently, the
appellate court refrained from a thorough discussion of the existence of

266. Id. at 1123.
267. Id. at 1126.
268. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
269. Awad, 670 F.3d at 1129.
270. Id. at 1130 (finding the authorities have “admitted . . . that they did not
know of even a single instance where an Oklahoma court had applied Sharia law or
used the legal precepts of other nations or cultures, let alone that such applications or
uses had resulted in concrete problems in Oklahoma.”).
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“a close fit with a compelling state interest.” 271 The court’s discussion
of irreparable harm in the absence of the injunction was also remarkably
brief, merely approving the district court’s holding. 272
In relation to the balance of harms prong, the court first disavowed
the argument that Oklahomans should have the right to see authorities
take their vote seriously. 273 The court explicitly rejected this idea,
reasoning that the balance of harms test prevents authorities from
enacting laws that seriously infringe upon the constitutional rights of
part of the population. 274 Similarly, the court found that avoiding
violation of citizens’ fundamental rights is always in the public interest,
and therefore affirmed the district court’s application of this prong of
the injunction test. 275
Finally, in the summer of 2013, the District Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma granted summary judgment in favor of the
plaintiff, permanently enjoining the authorities from implementing
State Question 755. 276 Although Awad v. Ziriax halted Oklahoma’s
Save Our State Amendment, such initiatives, largely defended as
necessary to combat a “barbaric” culture, 277 continue to appear. 278
However, as was the case with President Trump’s travel bans, the
presentation of these initiatives has changed: from explicitly anti-Sharia
to “facially neutral.” 279
271. Id. (holding that a further inquiry is useless because the strict scrutiny test
requires the presence of both a particular compelling interest and a close fit).
272. Id. at 1131.
273. Id. at 1132.
274. Id.
275. Id. (holding that “when the law that voters wish to enact is likely
unconstitutional, their interests do not outweigh Mr. Awad’s in having his
constitutional rights protected.”).
276. Chaudhry-Kravitz, supra note 251, at 32 (providing a brief timeline of the
legal proceedings in Awad v. Ziriax).
277. See Jeremy Grunert, How Do You Solve a Problem Like Sharia? Award v.
Ziriax and the Question of Sharia Law in America, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 695, 696 (2013).
278. Holly Tao, Congress, Courts, and Control over Persuasive Sources of
Law, 51 GONZ. L. REV. 235, 238 (2015) (examining the rise of anti-Sharia legal
initiatives in the United States).
279. Chaudhry-Kravitz, supra note 251, at 26–28 (explaining that after the
failure to realize an anti-Sharia bill in Oklahoma, the anti-Sharia movement has
decided to rethink its strategy and moved toward facially neutral measures that could
have the same effect as the Save our State Amendment).
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C. Facially Neutral, But Obviously Sectarian
Recall the history of President Trump’s travel bans: the Presidentelect asked his advisory team how he could realize his promised Muslim
travel ban in a legally-sound way. 280 The advisory team concluded the
threat of “danger” was an appropriate justification for banning
individuals from Muslim majority countries: the same category of
people the President had promised to single out for special travel
restrictions. 281 This shift to focusing on national security instead of
religion was “perfectly sensible, perfectly legal.” 282 But, as Justice
Sotomayor noted in Trump v. Hawaii, this use of neutral language does
little “to cleanse” such initiatives from their discriminatory purpose and
obvious animus toward specific groups. 283 Contrary to Justice
Sotomayor, the majority appeared to show sensitivity toward this shift,
concluding that “because there is persuasive evidence that the entry
suspension has a legitimate grounding in national security concerns,
quite apart from any religious hostility, we must accept that
independent justification.” 284
Apart from this adoption of more facially neutral language, there is
something else of theoretical relevance about the rise of these legal
initiatives that may explain the prevalence of animosity toward the
other. This may also help us conceptualize policies, like the travel bans,
that show obvious disdain toward individuals from Muslim majority
countries. Put differently, there exists a much deeper ideological root
280. W. Bradley Wendel, Sally Yates, Ronald Dworkin, and the Best View of
the Law, 115 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 78, 82 (2016) (using President Trump’s travel
ban as an example to answer the question “what happens when there are competing
accounts of what the law permits or requires?”).
281. Bennett L. Gershman, Rudolph Giuliani and the Ethics of Bullshit, 57 DUQ.
L. REV. 293, 303 (2019) (quoting Rudy Giuliani).
282. Jim Dwyer, First Came Giuliani’s Input on the Immigration Order. Now
TIMES
(Feb.
9,
2017),
There’s
the
Court
Test,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/09/nyregion/rudolph-giuliani-donald-trumptravel-ban.html. See also Ana Pottratz Acosta, Sunlight Is the Best Disinfectant: The
Role of the Media in Shaping Immigration Policy, 44 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV.
803, 841–42 (2018) (explaining how this specific statement has played a major role
in the litigations against the travel bans, saying that challengers have utilized
statements made in the media to find support for their Establishment Clause claim).
283. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2433 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
284. Id. at 2421.
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behind the contemporary animosity toward the non-white other:
misgivings about multiculturalism make a rejection of the Islamic
culture possible, specifically in the area of alternative dispute resolution
dealing with disputes that have a religious dimension. 285
Although criticism on religious arbitration as a form of alternative
dispute resolution might sound fair because of favoritism toward
religious people, singling them out for special favor, 286 it does not
justify singling out Muslims for special disfavor, either in the form of
travel bans or in the enactment of rules depriving them from living in
accordance with their faith. 287 This criticism touches upon the presence
of double standards that explicitly disfavor some groups. For example,
in the case of Oklahoma, the Save Our State Amendment singled out
explicitly Sharia law for special disfavor but remained silent as to other
285. The lack of appreciation of multiculturalism frustrates the possibility of
having “competing and independent legal orders,” enabling people to find appropriate
solutions for their civil law disputes in accordance with their religious convictions.
See Sukhsimranjit Singh, Religious Arbitration and Its Struggles with American Law
& Judicial Review, 16 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 360 (2016) (arguing that the debate
about multiculturalism is at the heart of the debate concerning the permissibility of
religious arbitration within secular systems); Joel A. Nichols, Religion, Marriage, and
Pluralism, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 967, 976 (2011) (saying that the “disconnect
between religious law and civil law, when combined with premises of
multiculturalism and the deep commitments of religious believers, has led to calls for
greater legal recognition of the decisions of religious tribunals.”). Cf. Michael A.
Helfand, Religious Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating
Conflicting Legal Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231, 1239 (2011) (purporting that antiSharia legal initiatives mainly “seek to undermine the ability of groups to serve as
competing and independent legal orders, thereby striking at the very heart of the new
multiculturalism.”).
286. Importantly, this concern can be seen as the other side of our critique so
far on measures that have singled out groups for a special disfavor qua religion.
Singling groups out for a special favor qua religion is on similar grounds very
objectionable. See generally Sohail Wahedi, Abstraction from the Religious
Dimension, 24 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (2017–2018) (discussing the liberal critique
on singling out religion for a special favor). For a critique of favoritism in relation to
religious arbitration, see Brian Hutler, Religious Arbitration and the Establishment
Clause, 33 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 337, 358 (2018). For a discussion on the
problem with favoritism, see generally Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Be
Exempt from Civil Rights Laws, 48 B.C. L. REV. 781, 788 (2007) (claiming that
favoritism toward certain groups undermines the authority of rules).
287. James A. Sonne, Domestic Applications of Sharia and the Exercise of
Ordered Liberty, 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 717, 728 (2015) (arguing a disfavored
treatment of Sharia law in courts is not justified).
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religious legal systems. 288 The courts in Awad easily parried the
concerns and shattered the illusion—created out of myths and persisting
conspiracy theories about Muslims—that Oklahoma was facing a huge
Sharia problem. The Supreme Court in Trump v. Hawaii, however,
showed sensitivity to the seemingly neutral re-description of the travel
ban, despite its undeniable and notorious history of hostility toward
Muslims.
Comparing the travel ban cases to the Save Our State Amendment
debacle raises three delicate and challenging questions. First, how do
we rationalize the return of exclusionary politics that single out people
with immigrant backgrounds for disfavored treatment? Second, how
can we understand the return of exclusionary politics as such? And
third, how can we spread awareness of the devastating effects of such
discriminatory policies?
The first question is contextual in nature. Fear has played a
significant role in both the enactment of the travel bans and in the rise
of anti-Sharia initiatives. 289 The fear of uncertainty as to who is
entering the country, namely potential terrorists, led to the issuance of
the travel ban. And it was the fear of who is already living here, namely
people who follow the rules of an evil tradition, that caused the wave of
anti-Sharia initiatives. This focus on border protection and preservation
of the majoritarian narrative led to the rise of fear-based politics not

288. Cf. Rahdert, supra note 254, at 557–58.
289. Fear plays a major role in cases that, in one way or another, threaten
majoritarian sensitivities. Cf. Sohail Wahedi, The Health Law Implications of Ritual
Circumcisions, 22 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L. J. 209, 211–12 (2019) (discussing the first
ever criminal trial in the United States regarding the permissibility of the lightest
version of female circumcision, separation of the mucous membrane from the girls’
genitalia, which was rhetorically presented as a horrifying case of brutality. While this
case concerned religious female circumcision that in all respects was less invasive
than religious male circumcision, the mass media attention for “genital mutilation”
made it impossible to say something meaningful about the lawfulness of this variant
of female circumcision); Saul Levmore, Can Wrinkles be Glamorous?, in SAUL
LEVMORE & MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, AGING THOUGHTFULLY: CONVERSATIONS
ABOUT RETIREMENT, ROMANCE, WRINKLES, AND REGRET 104 (2017) (“[T]he fact that
so many thoughtful people find female but not male circumcision abhorrent, suggests
that a critical difference is that one is practiced on a group that is, at least to Western
eyes, seriously constrained and subjugated by a variety of practices.”).
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grounded in a thorough and rationalist approach to the problems they
claim to solve. 290
The second question about how we should understand the return of
these exclusionary politics is a conceptual one. How did it come to be
that in both cases, the religious dimension was pushed to the margins?
The travel bans were presented—ultimately with great success—as
solutions to growing national security concerns. The Save Our State
Amendment, finding significantly less success, was presented merely
as a choice-of-law or choice-of-forum issue. This sharp abstraction
from the religious dimension, 291 particularly to the field of national
security, has made it possible to marginalize serious criticism of the
travel restrictions. After all, who could be against national security
measures? 292
The third question is about recommendations, focusing primarily
on how to overcome the era of fear and spread awareness of the
devastating effects of policies that single out minority groups for
disfavored treatment. But before we can address solutions to the
challenges posed by these fear-based politics, we must first identify and
define what is at risk.
III. FREE OUR POLITICS FROM ANIMUS
Following our analysis of fear-driven politics, we are left with two
fundamental questions. First, how can we conceptualize such politics?
More specifically: against which theoretical backdrop can we
conceptualize politics that single out specific groups—in our case,
American Muslims—for special disfavored treatment? And second,
how can we save our politics from fear and animus in an era of terror,
anxiety, and social unrest?
What is interesting about the travel ban project and the Save Our
State debacle is that we can identify some facially neutral justification
in both cases. While both situations could easily be characterized as
concerning animus toward Muslims, there is another approach:
290. Cf. Bhuta, supra note 254.
291. Cf. Wahedi, supra note 286, at 37.
292. See, e.g., Michael Coenen & Seth Davis, Minor Courts, Major Questions,
70 VAND. L. REV. 777, 838 (2017) (discussing President Trump’s style of leadership
and suggesting that “today’s conditions of partisanship and polarization significantly
reduce the possibility of meaningful oversight . . . ”).
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abstraction from the religious dimension. This is reflected in the Trump
administration’s decision to translate the President’s promise to shut
down the borders to Muslims. The administration found a suitable and
legally acceptable way to keep that promise, shifting the attention from
religion and instead focusing on national security. This strategy
corresponded with concerns intelligence services generally have about
people coming from conflict areas, such as the Middle East and other
Muslim-majority countries. A similar strategy was adopted in the
Sharia ban cases: shifting the attention from religion to choice-of-law
and choice-of-forum issues.
Both security concerns and choice-of-law issues were facially
neutral and, therefore, suitable substitutes for the categories they
effectively targeted. But what does abstraction from the religious
dimension entail and how does it work in relation to the fear-driven
politics discussed in this article? To answer this question, we must first
acknowledge that the idea of abstraction, as discussed here, derives
from the scholarly debate about the relationship between law and
religion within the paradigm of liberal political philosophy.293
Basically, liberal theories of religious freedom dealing with the
specialness of religion for either religious accommodation or
justification of public decisions 294 have one major commonality:
abstraction from the religious dimension. 295
Liberal theories of religious freedom are skeptical about the
specialness of religion, rejecting the special legal solicitude toward
religion. 296 In other words, there should be no room for sectarian

293. For a discussion of the debate surrounding the place of religion in liberal
political philosophy, see generally CÉCILE LABORDE & AURÉLIA BARDON, RELIGION
IN LIBERAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (2017).
294. Cf. Micah Schwartzman, What if Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1351, 1357 (2012).
295. Wahedi, supra note 286, at 37.
296. Cf. Kenneth Einar Himma, An Unjust Dogma: Why a Special Right to
Religion Wrongly Discriminates Against Non-Religious Worldviews, 54 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 217, 219 (2017). See generally BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION?
(2014); RONALD DWORKIN, RELIGION WITHOUT GOD (2013); MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE (2008); CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER &
LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2007) (all
agreeing that sectarian arguments in favor of religious freedom are insufficient to
justify singling out religion for special legal solicitude).
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justifications of the special legal solicitude toward religion. 297 Within
this approach, religion can only be considered special and, thus, a
protection-worthy category via abstraction. That is to say, via the
identification of its liberal and neutral substitutes. 298 The question
becomes whether politics of fear, as described in this article, are
paradigmatic expressions of abstraction. Intuitively, the answer is yes.
Because of the strong rejectionist nature of the abstraction thesis that
aims to find liberal substitutes for religion, explaining based hereon,
why it is for example worthy to protect some religious practices, such
as wearing headscarves or consuming Halal and Kosher food.
Ultimately, not because these cases concern matters of religion, but
because they concern matters of conscience. 299
This rejection of the religious dimension that defines the
abstraction strategy makes sense when analyzing the Government’s
decision to present the travel ban as purely a security matter. This also
helps explain why authorities in Oklahoma strongly emphasized
approaching State Question 755 solely as a choice-of-law matter. In
both cases, abstraction was a useful strategy to shift the conversation
away from religion and its serious constitutional concerns.
Although it may be true that abstraction from the religious
dimension, as presented here, could be used to declare every unpopular
religious act out of order, 300 abstraction also emphasizes the importance
of egalitarianism. In this context, that means authorities should enable
all citizens to make use of their basic liberties to the same extent.
Conversely, authorities should not favor one group at the expense of
another. Thus, because of its emphasis on egalitarianism, abstraction

297. For a sectarian defense of religious freedom, see Michael W. McConnell,
Why Protect Religious Freedom?, 123 YALE L.J. 770, 786–89 (2013); Michael Stokes
Paulsen, The Priority of God: A Theory of Religious Liberty, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1159,
1183 (2013).
298. See, e.g., JOCELYN MACLURE & CHARLES TAYLOR, SECULARISM AND
FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE 89 (2011) (considering freedom of conscience an
appropriate substitute for freedom of religion).
299. Cf. LEITER, supra note 296, at 64; MACLURE & TAYLOR, supra note 298, at
77.
300. Sohail Wahedi, Freedom of Religion and Living Together, 49 CAL. W.
INT’L L.J. 213 (2018–2019) (explaining European cases of singling out Muslims for
special restrictions in light of abstraction from the religious dimension).
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disapproves a favored treatment of religion. But it also disapproves—
for reasons of neutrality—a disfavored treatment of religion. 301
Neither the travel ban nor the Save Our State Amendment can pass
the second prong of abstraction: the ban on singling out groups of
people or beliefs for special restrictions. Animosity toward Muslims
was obviously present in both cases. The travel ban claims to deal with
security measures, keeping potential terrorists, rapists, honor killers,
and other troublemakers outside the United States. The Save Our State
Amendment similarly hid the religious concerns of its Muslim victims
by positing that it aims solely to see that Oklahoma courts utilize only
American laws, rather than any foreign laws.
The question now becomes how to overcome this era of anxiety
toward the other. Anti-Sharia legal initiatives did not stop after Awad.
In fact, there has been an increase in the amount of such initiatives
proposed throughout the country. Additionally, the Islamic faith has
been singled out for special restrictions in the areas of labor and land
allocation for religious institutes.
Obviously, politics of fear are contrary to the promise of the
American Dream. The only legacies these fear-driven politics will
leave will be the creation of disparities between groups of people,
downgrading them to secondary citizens; 302 the reinforcement of
majoritarianism and the political advancement of a clearly xenophobic
immigration agenda; 303 and, above all, the institutionalization of
Islamophobia. 304
But we should not give up quickly. We may still have some hope
to overcome this era of anxiety, animus, and disregard of the
constitutional traditions of freedom and neutrality. Justice Kennedy’s
concurring opinion regarding public manners in Trump v. Hawaii
provides some guidance here. A broad interpretation of Justice
Kennedy’s forceful plea reminds the authorities to be mindful of what
the constitutional tradition tells them; to bear in mind the freedoms

301. Cf. DWORKIN, supra note 296, at 130 (defending the line that liberal
democracies should not abandon a particular lifestyle because another lifestyle is
“intrinsically better.” It should be left to citizens to decide which way of life better
suits them).
302. Ali, supra note 37, at 1031.
303. Kapur, supra note 176, at 307.
304. See generally Beydoun, supra note 36.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol56/iss1/6

64

Wahedi: Muslims and the Myths in the Immigration Politics of the United S
Wahedi camera ready FINAL (Do Not Delete)

2019]

1/30/2020 10:25 AM

MUSLIMS AND THE MYTHS

199

guaranteed in the Constitution; and to be aware of legal constraints,
such as the Establishment Clause. 305
Indeed, we should not forget this country is “built upon the promise
of religious liberty. [The Founding Fathers] honored that core promise
by embedding the principle of religious neutrality in the First
Amendment.” 306 Similarly, we should keep in mind what Dr. King
fought to achieve: more equality and less disparity. Pursuing the ideal
of equal liberty and equal respect for human beings in a highly divided
world is the least we can do to honor Dr. King’s powerful and timeless
dream.
Just as important as the plea for equal liberty, public manners, and
respect for the constitutional tradition, is the need for having and
maintaining “a Judiciary willing to hold the [political] branches
[accountable] when they defy our most sacred legal commitments,”
such as religious freedom. 307
CONCLUSION
Immigration has always been subject to great political debate in the
United States. Today, however, the explicit use of anti-immigration
rhetoric has become common among a significant portion of the
political establishment. This rhetoric has provoked the immigration
debate and shaped the contours of the contemporary political discourse
concerning immigration. With the 2016 election of President Trump
came a tougher attitude toward immigration and immigrants.
Subsequently, the 2018 midterm elections revealed an increase in
“Islamophobic” rhetoric among political campaigners. This stricter
attitude toward immigration has manifested itself in two ways. First,
through the aggressive language used to discuss immigration. And
second, through the proliferation of restrictions aiming to inhibit
immigrants from entering the United States.
What is striking about both political developments is the undue use
of stereotypes. These stereotypes have intensified concerns about
undocumented immigrants, illegal border crossings, and national
security threats. Specifically, this latter concern has been used to justify

305. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2424 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
306. Id. at 2433 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
307. Id. at 2448.
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the special need for radical measures in the fight against immigration—
measures ranging from building a separation wall between the United
States and Mexico to denying citizens of some countries access into the
United States. As a consequence of this harsh political reality, people
with immigrant backgrounds suffer from harassment, hatred, and racial
profiling.
This article has focused on the challenges faced by one group in
particular: the Muslim community.
The contemporary antiimmigration atmosphere draws upon fears of uncertainty about who is
crossing the borders and who is living here. To deal with these
concerns, authorities have singled out Muslims and their faith for
special restrictions. This is obviously discriminatory and contrary to
the rich constitutional tradition of freedom and neutrality.
To halt a further racialization of Muslims and to overcome the
contemporary era of fear, anxiety, and distrust, we must act in
accordance with and uphold the constitutional tradition of freedom and
neutrality. We must foster a strong judiciary that can halt the executive
and legislative branches if necessary. We must keep in mind: no more
racial discrimination, but equal liberty and equal respect toward the
other, even if the other does not share our beliefs or our way of life.
EPILOGUE
The travel ban project and the Save Our State debacle fit a broader
tendency of disregarding constitutional traditions of religious liberty
and state neutrality toward religion, applying double standards and
framing the “other” as dangerous, unwelcome, and unfit.
Unfortunately, this tendency is present across many liberal
democracies: from the Far East, to the Middle East, Europe, and North
America. Of these places, the situation in Europe is comparable to, and
in some instances even worse, than what we see happening in the United
States. The rise in measures targeting people with an Islamic
background is perplexing. And the restraint of the judiciary to defend
“our most sacred legal commitments” is regrettable. 308
As such, the religious freedom jurisprudence of the European Court
of Human Rights is notoriously Islamophobic in nature, likely resting

308. Id.
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on myths about Muslims, 309 rather than drawing on an approach
attesting to equal respect and equal liberty. 310 It has proven to be very
“lenient toward practices of Christian establishment and overtly
intolerant toward the presence of Islam.” 311 But more alarming is the
rise of concrete measures across European states singling out the
Islamic faith for special bans. For example, in 2015, Austria adopted
the “Islam-bill,” singling out Islamic organizations and banning them
from receiving foreign funding. 312 More recently, the European
Parliament has proposed to close all Islamic centers, including mosques
and other institutes that operate contrary to values of the European
Union, while again leaving other religions unmentioned. 313
Abstraction may be a helpful strategy to separate practices from
their religious dimension, but it is never a justificatory strategy for
discrimination, religious intolerance, or the spread of hatred toward
unpopular religious groups.

309. Peter G. Danchin, Of Prophets and Proselytes: Freedom of Religion and
the Conflict of Rights in International Law, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 249, 275 (2008)
(saying with reference to critics of the case law of this Court that “there appears to be
a bias in the jurisprudence of the [European Court of Human Rights] under article 9
toward protecting traditional and established religions and a corresponding
insensitivity toward the rights of minority, nontraditional, or unpopular religious
groups.”). See also Samuel Moyn, Religious Freedom and the Fate of Secularism, in
RELIGION, SECULARISM, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 27 (Jean Louise Cohen
& Cécile Laborde Eds., 2016) (asking rhetorically with respect to the systematically
different legal treatment of Islamic cases before the ECtHR: “Do the cases . . . reflect
a Christian Islamophobia in the principled garb of secularism?”).
310. Christian Joppke, Pluralism vs. Pluralism: Islam and Christianity in the
European Court of Human Rights, in RELIGION, SECULARISM, AND CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY 88 (Jean Louise Cohen & Cécile Laborde Eds., 2016) (analyzing the
case law of the European Court of Human Rights in religious freedom cases and
claiming the Court interprets pluralism as a value that is threatened by the Islamic
faith and therefore needs protection).
311. CÉCILE LABORDE, LIBERALISM’S RELIGION 33 (2017).
312. See Elahe Izadi, Austria Is Taking Controversial Steps to Tighten a 100POST
(Feb.
26,
2015),
Year-Old
‘Law
on
Islam’,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/02/26/austria-istaking-controversial-steps-to-tighten-a-100-year-old-law-on-islam/.
313. Wahedi, supra note 300, at 228.
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